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Revolutionary Reform in German  
Constitutional Law 
 
BY STEPHAN JAGGI1 
 
Introduction 
 
In his article “Three Paths to Constitutionalism – and the Crisis of the 
European Union” Bruce Ackerman argues that the Federal Republic of 
Germany stands for a way to constitutionalism in which “ordinary citizens 
remain passive while political and social elites construct a new 
constitution”.2  Ackerman calls this model “elitist constitutionalism”3 and 
distinguishes it from two other models, the revolutionary model where 
successful revolutionary outsiders embed their revolutionary principles in a 
new constitution, and the insider model in which pragmatic insiders 
undermine revolutionary movements by enacting landmark reform 
legislation that brings about fundamental change but keeps the insiders in 
power.4 The German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), according to 
Ackerman, has contributed to resolving the German Constitution’s 
legitimacy problem not by referring to revolutionary achievements of the 
constitutional past but by projecting itself “as the preeminent guardian of 
Germany’s post-1945 foundational commitments.”5  
My thesis is that, since German unification in October 1990, this 
diagnosis of constitutionalism in Germany is only partly true. I will show 
 
 1. Associate Professor of Law, Peking University School of Transnational Law, and 
formerly a Judge at the Supreme Court of the State of Schleswig-Holstein/Germany.  The 
topic of this article is part of a broader analysis of the East German 1989 Revolution and its 
impact on unified Germany’s constitutional law in STEPHAN JAGGI, THE 1989 REVOLUTION IN 
EAST GERMANY AND ITS IMPACT ON UNIFIED GERMANY’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE 
FORGOTTEN REVOLUTION? (Hart and Nomos, 2016) 
 2. Bruce Ackerman, Three Paths to Constitutionalism – and the Crisis of the European 
Union, B.J.Pol.S. 45, 705 (2015). 
 3. Id., at 707. 
 4. See id., at 707 et seq. 
 5. Id., at 711. 
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that, in the wake of German unification, the BVerfG acted within 
Ackerman’s revolutionary model and did refer to revolutionary 
achievements of the constitutional past. Contrary to Ackerman’s evaluation, 
the Court engaged in what I call “revolutionary reform” of German 
constitutional law by taking up revolutionary constitutional achievements of 
the East German 1989 Revolution and integrating them into the existing 
constitutional order under the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz; GG).  
It is through revolutionary reform, I will argue, that the BVerfG has brought 
important change to unified Germany’s constitutional law.  
It is right that popular sovereignty did not amount to more than idle talk 
during the adoption of the GG in 1949.  Since then, the West German party 
system has successfully kept democracy strictly representative and has 
reduced the people’s political role to that of voters on Election Day.  The 
East German 1989 Revolution, however, confronted Germans with a 
completely new political experience: popular sovereignty can work, not only 
as a theoretical concept to legitimize the existing political order but as a 
practical experience of political action. I have shown elsewhere that East 
Germans with their 1989 Revolution not only abolished a party dictatorship 
and threw open the door to German unification. They adopted an own set of 
constitutional principles and succeeded in transferring at least some of these 
principles to unified Germany.6  In this article, I will demonstrate how 
unified Germany’s institutions in general and the BVerfG in particular 
integrated these principles into the existing constitutional order under the GG 
in acts of revolutionary reform.  
After briefly summarizing the East German revolutionaries’ 
constitutional achievements and their transfer to unified Germany, I will first 
give a brief overview of how unified Germany’s legislature mostly failed at 
integrating these achievements into unified Germany’s constitutional order.  
One exception to this rule is the principle of constitutional environmental 
protection, which the legislature integrated successfully.  A case analysis 
will then show how it was primarily the BVerfG who used constitutional 
interpretation as a means to successfully integrate revolutionary 
achievements into the existing constitutional order under the GG and bring 
some important change to Germany’s constitutional law.  
 
 
 
 
 6. Stephan Jaggi, Revolutionary Constitutional Lawmaking in Germany - Rediscovering 
the German 1989 Revolution, 17 GERMAN L.J. 579 (2016). 
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A. Revolutionary Achievements and their Transfer to Unified 
 Germany 
 
As I have elaborated elsewhere, the East Germans used their revolution 
to develop a distinct constitutional agenda the core elements of which may 
be summarized as individual empowerment and environmental protection.7 
Individual empowerment stands for a set of constitutional social rights and 
principles that seek to realize individual rights—to make them a social reality 
rather than merely a formal legal position.  For example, the revolutionaries 
demanded a right to decent housing, a right to labor, free access to public 
education, and a right to a system of social security aimed at enabling people 
to live a life of equal opportunity and independence.  They, moreover, called 
for real equality for women, for example through a government obligation to 
promote equal treatment of women on the job and in public life, in education, 
in the family, and in the field of social security, as well as a right to a “self-
determined pregnancy” and a government obligation to protect the unborn 
life through public welfare.8  Constitutional environmental protection 
establishes constitutional government obligations to protect the environment 
and provide individual rights to that effect.  For example, the revolutionaries 
demanded a constitutional obligation of the government and all citizens to 
protect the natural environment as a “foundation of life for present and future 
generations”.9  The government’s environmental policy must prevent 
damage to the environment and make sure that natural resources are used 
moderately, and everybody who claims that her health is endangered by 
environmental destruction shall have a right of access to environmental data 
of her living environment.10 
In a next step, the revolutionaries used the so-called Unification Treaty 
(UT)11, a treaty that the first freely elected East German government entered 
into with the West German government that determined the conditions of 
German unification, as well as the constitutions of the newly established East 
German states to transfer these principles to unified Germany.12 
Once transferred, the traditional and most obvious way of integrating 
 
 7. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 582 et seq., 585 et seq., 595 et seq. 
 8. Id. at 597. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. The Treaty’s official name is Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands - 
Einigungsvertrag - v. 31. August 1990 (BGBl II S. 889). 
 12. For a detailed analysis, see Id., at 612 et seq. 
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revolutionary achievements into the existing West German constitutional 
order under the GG was to either amend the GG or to adopt a completely 
new constitution.  These were the two options referred to in Art. 5 UT, which 
“recommended” that, within two years after unification, the “legislative 
institutions of unified Germany” deal with questions of amending or 
complementing the GG that were raised “in the context of unification”.  Art. 
5 UT listed particular questions the legislature was encouraged to tackle, 
such as the question of adding state-goal provisions to the GG and the 
question of adopting a new constitution through a plebiscite.13 
It soon became clear, however, that unified Germany’s federal 
legislature was reluctant to touch the GG.  Since amending the GG requires 
a 2/3 majority in both chambers of the federal legislature, conservatives 
managed to prevent many of the changes referred to in the UT.  Yet, where 
the legislature failed, the BVerfG stepped in and integrated revolutionary 
achievements into the existing West German constitutional order through 
constitutional interpretation. 
In what follows, I will first briefly summarize the legislature’s mostly 
futile attempts to integrate revolutionary achievements into unified 
Germany’s constitutional order in order to then show where and how the 
BVerfG mastered the integrative challenge. 
 
B. Integration Through the Legislature 
 
Most authors argue that the legislature was completely free in deciding 
whether or not to follow Art. 5 UT’s “recommendations” to deal with 
questions of amending the GG in order to integrate revolutionary 
achievement.14  They, moreover, argue that any change of the existing 
constitutional order, including the decision to adopt a new constitution 
through a plebiscite, had to be made in compliance with the GG and thus 
required a 2/3 majority in both chambers of the federal legislature.15  Facing 
a conservative majority in the Bundestag16, the chances for constitutional 
change through the legislature were low. 
 
 13. See Art. 5 UT. 
 14. See Klaus Stern, Die Wiederherstellung der staatlichen Einheit, in: Klaus Stern & 
Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu (eds.), Verträge und Rechtsakte zur Deutschen Einheit, Band 2: 
Einigungsvertrag und Wahlvertrag, 3, 47 (1990) with further references. 
 15. See id. at 47 et seq. with further references. 
 16. The German federal legislature consists of two chambers, the Bundestag which is the 
federal parliament, and the Bundesrat which is the chamber representing the state 
governments. 
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The federal legislature started several initiatives to pursue the task 
embedded in Article 5 UT.  The most serious one was the so-called “Board 
of Trustees for a democratically constituted Federation of German States” 
(“Kuratorium für einen demokratisch verfaßten Bund deutscher Länder”) 
(Kuratorium),17 a citizens’ initiative founded in Berlin on June 16, 1990 and 
consisting of 200 members with different backgrounds from East and West 
Germany.18  The Kuratorium’s goal was to call a Constitutional Convention 
to draft a new constitution for unified Germany, which should then be put to 
a plebiscite by the German people.19  The Kuratorium produced a draft 
constitution20 that clearly reflected revolutionary achievements by 
promoting individual empowerment through social rights (rights to labor, 
social security, and housing),21 affirmative action for women, and a right to 
abortion and well as environmental protection by placing “the conservation 
of nature” for present and future generations as well as “nature in its own 
right” under particular protection.22  The Draft was presented to the public 
on June 16, 1991, in Frankfurt, but then died a silent death because of its 
inability to muster the necessary 2/3 majority in the federal legislature 
necessary to put it to a plebiscite. 
The next initiative was undertaken by the Bundesrat who established a 
“Commission Constitutional Reform of the Bundesrat” (“Kommission 
Verfassungsreform des Bundesrates”) consisting of representatives of all 16 
states.23 The Commission proposed to add to the GG environmental 
protection as a goal to be pursued by the government24 but was unable to 
agree on anything with respect to social rights or equality for women.25 
 
 17. For an overview of the Kuratorium and its work, see Gerald Häfner, Denkschrift zum 
Verfassungsentwurf des Kuratoriums für einen demokratisch verfassten Bund deutscher 
Länder, in: Erich Fischer & Werner Künzel (eds.), Verfassungsdiskussion und 
Verfassungsgebung 1990 bis 1994 in Deutschland, Kommentare und Dokumente, Band I, 53 
et seq. (2005); Bernd Guggenberger & Ulrich Preuß & Wolfgang Ullmann (eds.), Eine 
Verfassung für Deutschland (1991). 
 18. See Erich Fischer, Vom Runden Tisch zum Grundgesetz, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra 
note 17, 36. 
 19. See id. at 57 et seq. 
 20. See The Kuratorium’s Draft Constitution of June 29, 1991 (Kuratorium’s Draft), 
reprinted in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 259 et seq. 
 21. See Art. 12a, 12b, and 13a Kuratorium’s Draft. 
 22. See Art. 20a Kuratorium’s Draft; Häfner, supra note 17, 62, 74, 75. 
 23. For this and the following, see Fischer, supra note 18, 48. 
 24. See Bericht der Kommission Verfassungsreform des Bundesrates of May 14, 1992, 
reprinted in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 420 et seq., 451. 
 25. Id. at 444 et seq., 450 et seq. 
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Finally, Bundestag and Bundesrat decided to establish a joint 
commission, the so-called Joint Constitutional Commission (Gemeinsame 
Verfassungskommission, GVK) to tackle Art. 5 UT’s “recommendations”. 
It consisted of 64 representatives, 32 from each chamber,26 only eleven of 
which were East Germans.27  From the outset the GVK emphasized that its 
task was not only Art. 5 UT but more generally to “examine the 
constitutional questions regarding the necessity to amend the GG that had 
come up in the political discussion”.28  The GVK, too, operated under a 2/3 
majority requirement to adopt any proposals, and despite the fact that social 
rights, such as labor, housing, and social security mustered majorities in the 
GVK they could not overcome the 2/3-hurdle.29  Most of the GVK’s 
proposals were thus related to furthering Germany’s European integration 
and to improving the relationship between the federal government and the 
states.30  Still, the GVK succeeded in making two proposals with respect to 
integrating revolutionary achievements.  It proposed to add to the GG (i) a 
state goal of environmental protection and (ii) a new sentence to Art. 3 II GG 
according to which the government furthers the implementation of equal 
rights for women and men and promotes the removal of existing 
disadvantages.31  Based on these proposals the federal legislature on 
September 23, 1994 adopted the following amendments to the GG:32  
Art. 3 II, 2 GG: The government shall promote the implementation of 
 
 26. See Eckart Busch, Die Gemeinsame Verfassungskommission von Bundestag und 
Bundesrat - eine neuartige Institution in der 12. Wahlperiode, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra 
note 17, 96 et seq. 
 27. This is pointed out by Hans-Jochen Vogel in a speech during the meeting of the 
Bundestag on Feb. 4, 1994; see the Stenographic Report of the meeting, reprinted in: Fischer 
& Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 694 et seq. (701). 
 28. See GVK Report, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 522; the original 
reads: “Sie [the GVK] sah es auch als ihre Aufgabe an, in der politischen Diskussion aktuell 
gewordene verfassungsrechtliche Fragen im Hinblick auf die Notwendigkeit einer Änderung 
des Grundgesetzes zu untersuchen.“ 
 29. See GVK Report, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 589; Peter Quint, 
The Imperfect Union, Constitutional Structures of German Unification, 117 (1997). 
 30. For a list of the amendments to the GG proposed by the GVK, see Recommendations 
of the Common Constitutional Commission on Changing and Complementing the 
Grundgesetz, reprinted in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 684 et seq.  For the 
extended version of the GVK recommendations, including annotations, see GVK Report, in 
Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 527 et seq. 
 31. Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, at 684. 
 32. September 23, 1994 is the day on which the Bundesrat accepted the GG-amending 
law as adopted by the Bundestag on September 6, 1994; see Beschluß des Bundesrates v. 
23.09.1994, reprinted in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 1002. For the GG-
amending law, see BGBl I 1994, 3146. 
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equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate existing 
disadvantages; 
Art. 20a GG: Mindful of its responsibility towards future generations, 
the government shall protect the natural foundations of life by legislation 
and, in accordance with law and justice, by executive and judicial action, all 
within the framework of the constitutional order.33 
East Germans were disappointed with these results. Roland Resch, for 
example, Minister from the East German state of Brandenburg, complained 
that revolutionary experiences demands had not been sufficiently taken into 
account.34  Konrad Elmer complained that the debate within the GVK had 
been neither sufficiently public nor sufficiently open to new arguments and 
that East German concerns had not sufficiently been considered.35 But also 
the West German Hans-Jochen Vogel complained that the changes were 
minimal and signified a missed opportunity to modernize and improve the 
GG.36  Conservatives, on the other hand, welcomed the lack of major 
change.37 
Despite many revolutionaries’ disappointment, I think that the new 
Article 20a GG must be considered a successful integration into the GG of 
the revolutionary demand for constitutional environmental protection. 
As regards Art. 20a GG’s content, it is undisputed that it establishes 
environmental protection as an objective constitutional goal, not as a 
subjective individual right.38  As such, it is binding on all governmental 
institutions but does not grant an individual right to bring a law suit based on 
the claim that Art. 20a GG has been violated.  It is also uncontroversial that 
 
 33. This version entered into force on Nov. 15, 1994. The state goal of animal protection 
was added in 2002 (BGBl I 2002, 2862); see Rupert Scholz, in Theodor Maunz & Günther 
Dürig, Grundgesetz, Art. 20a, para. 1 (62 ed. 2011). 
 34. See Resch, in: GVK Final Session Protocol, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, 
Band II, 508, 509. 
 35. See Elmer, in: GVK Final Session Protocol, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, 
Band II, 509. 
 36. Hans Jochen Vogel, Aus dem Wesen nichts Neues, Neue Justiz (NJ), 145 et seq., 149 
(1994). 
 37. See the statements of CDU/CSU and FDP representatives, in: GVK Final Session 
Protocol, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 494 et seq. and in: Stenographic 
Report of the 209. Meeting of the Bundestag on Feb. 4, 1994, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra 
note 17, Band III, 694 et seq.; from the literature, see, for example, Josef Isensee, Mit blauem 
Auge davongekommen - das Grundgesetz - Zu Arbeit und Resultaten der Gemeinsamen 
Verfassungskommission, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1993, 2583, 2584; Quint, 
The Imperfect Union, supra note 28, 116. 
 38. See for this and the following Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a, para. 32 et seq. with 
further references. 
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Art. 20a GG marks the first time that the GG includes an explicit state goal 
of environmental protection.39 
Conservatives hold the view that Art. 20a GG’s adoption was, 
regardless of its outward connection with Art. 5 UT, “not really caused by 
unification” and had no “immediate-substantive relation” with it.40  They 
deny any meaningful connection between the 1989 Revolution, unification, 
and the introduction of environmental protection into the GG.  Instead, they 
to explain Art. 20a GG as the product of a constitutional debate that had been 
going on in West Germany for many years.41  This opinion’s bottom line is 
that all political parties in West Germany agreed on constitutional 
environmental protection; it only took them until 1994 to finally find a 
common formulation and adopt the new Art. 20a GG.42 
I think that this is wrong. Emphasizing the deep roots of constitutional 
environmental protection in West German political discourse, conservatives 
are unable to answer an important question: Why had West German parties 
been unable to agree on constitutional environmental protection prior to 
German unification, but were able to adopt Art. 20a GG in 1994 four years 
after German unification as the result of a constitutional debate based on Art. 
5 UT? 
Most authors avoid that question.43 One author at least concedes some 
correlation between Art. 20a GG, the 1989 Revolution, and German 
unification. Michael Kloepfer writes that “[w]ith unification the climate with 
respect to constitutional amendments at the federal level changed, 
particularly regarding environmental protection . . . .”  He, moreover, refers 
to the fact that both the Treaty on the Currency, Economic, and Social Union 
and the UT stipulated environmental protection as a goal of unified 
Germany.44 Kloepfer considers this an acknowledgement of “the outstanding 
role that citizens’ and environmental groups had played in overthrowing the 
 
 39. Id. para. 30. 
 40. See Rupert Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a para. 1. 
 41. See Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a paras. 3 et seq. 
 42. See Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a paras. 19 et seq., 25; Nicolai Müller-Bromley, 
Verfassungsentwicklung zum Umweltschutz in Deutschland 1990-1194, in: Fischer & 
Künzel, supra note 17, 269 et seq. 
 43. Scholz, for example, does not say a word as to why an agreement had finally become 
possible; see Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a GG; similarly Müller-Bromley, supra note 42, 
267 et seq. 
 44. Michael Kloepfer, in: Rudolf Dolzer & Wolfgang Kahl & Christian Waldhoff et al. 
(eds.), Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 116. Aktualisierung, April 2005, Art. 20a para. 
7; also Michael Kloepfer, Umweltschutz als Verfassungsrecht: Zum neuen Art. 20 a GG, 
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (DVBl) 1996, 73. 
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GDR regime”.45  He hints at “political pressure” on unified Germany’s 
federal legislature, which had increased in the aftermath of unification and 
speculates that the legislature saw constitutional environmental protection as 
a chance to lend some “glamour” to the otherwise “dry” project of reforming 
the GG.46 
I want to provide a more specific and a more specifically constitutional 
explanation.  My thesis is that Art. 20a GG is the result of a popular mandate 
that the revolutionary East Germans had given unified Germany’s 
legislature. Environmental protection featured prominently on the 
revolutionaries’ constitutional agenda, it was transferred to unified 
Germany, and the new Art. 20a GG integrated it into the existing GG. 
The East German citizens’ movements had made environmental 
protection an important goal of the new government they had wanted to 
establish through their peaceful revolution.47  That can already be seen in the 
citizens’ movements’ “Call for an independent GDR”, published in 
November 1989.  The call mentioned environmental protection right next to 
revolutionary goals, such as peace, individual freedom, and social justice.48 
Reconciling a market economy with democracy, individual rights, social 
justice, and environmental protection had been at the heart of the citizens’ 
movements’ constitutional agenda.49  Environmental protection groups had 
been among the first opposition groups in the GDR in the 1980s.50   
The people in the streets had adopted environmental protection as an 
important constitutional goal of their Revolution. Pictures of Monday 
demonstrations in Leipzig, for example, show banners warning against 
“progress without ecology” and “ecological death” and demanding “more 
ecology in industry and the agrarian economy” right next to banners calling 
for the SED government’s resignation, free elections, and German 
unification.51  Tetzner, a regular participant in these demonstrations, writes 
that “the stinking rivers” and “the often toxic air in the city” were among the 
 
 45. Kloepfer, in: Dolzer & Kahl & Waldhoff et al. (eds.); supra note 44, Art. 20a para. 
7; GDR stands for “German Democratic Republic”, East Germany’s name prior to German 
unification. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 583 et seq., 587. 
 48. Id. at 585. 
 49. Id. at 583 et seq. 
 50. See Rainer Tetzner, Leipziger Ring, Aufzeichnungen eines Montagsdemonstraten 
1989/90, 53 (2004). 
 51. These banners are visible on pictures of Monday demonstrations in Leipzig on 
display in Zeitgeschichtliches Forum Leipzig, Grimmaische Strasse 6, 04109 Leipzig. 
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demonstrators’ major concerns.52 
The revolutionaries’ early efforts at drafting a new constitution for East 
Germany featured a modernized individual rights catalogue including, 
among other things, environmental protection.53  
East Germany’s first freely elected government, too, had emphasized 
its commitment to environmental protection by formulating the goal of 
establishing an ecologically responsible social market economy and 
presenting environmental protection as a key element of a planned economic 
cooperation with West Germany and the European Community.54 
Art. 5 and 34 UT as well as the new state constitutions had transferred 
the revolutionary achievement of constitutional environmental protection to 
unified Germany.55 
Against this background, the revolutionary East Germans had given 
unified Germany’s federal legislature a clear mandate to introduce 
environmental protection into the GG; the West Germans had agreed by 
signing the UT. Viewed from this perspective, the fact that controversies that 
had prevented the introduction of environmental protection into the GG for 
more than 20 years could be overcome in 1994 acquires a new meaning. 
What conservatives try to present as the result of pure chance or “political 
pressure” starts to appear as a legislative act of integrating the revolutionary 
achievement of constitutional environmental protection into the existing 
constitutional order under the GG. 
Signs of this integrative effort are visible in the text of the new Art. 20a 
GG. The responsibility for “future generations” is a clear reference to the 
revolutionaries’ early draft constitution, the so-called Round Table Draft 
(RTD), which was the first constitutional document in Germany to refer to 
“future generations” in connection with environmental protection.56  As a 
result of integration, the revolutionaries’ original demand for a judicially 
enforceable constitutional right to environmental protection (as expressed in 
the constitutional right to information about environmental data and in the 
 
 52. Tetzner, supra note 50. 
 53. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 597. 
 54. See Government Declaration delivered by Minster President Lothar de Maiziere to 
the GDR Parliament (Volkskammer) on Apr. 19, 1990, published as CDU Texte 3/90 by the 
Geschäftsstellle des Parteivorstandes der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands 
(CDU), Charlottenstrasse 53/54, Berlin 1086, p. 11. 
 55. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 620. Art. 16 of the Treaty on the Establishment of a Currency, 
Economic, and Social Union of May 18, 1990, had already stipulated environmental 
protection as a goal of the contracting parties (i.e., the GDR and West Germany). Referring 
to this Art. 16, Art. 34 UT states that environmental protection is the legislature’s task. 
 56. See Art. 33 (1) RTD; Jaggi, supra note 6, 596; Müller-Bromley, supra note 42, 268. 
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right of environmental groups to bring law suits)57 has given way to 
environmental protection as a purely objective government goal. There is no 
doubt that the new Art. 20a GG’s text reflects a “formula compromise” that 
enables the political opponents to interpret it in a way that it says whatever 
they want it to say.58  Still, Art. 20a GG manifests the revolutionary 
achievement of constitutional environmental protection in an explicit 
provision of the GG for the first time in the GG’s history.  It is thus more 
meaningfully described as a successful legislative act of integrating a 
revolutionary constitutional achievement than as political happenstance. 
The success with respect to environmental protection, however, must 
not obscure the fact that the legislature mostly failed in its attempts to 
integrate transferred revolutionary achievements into unified Germany’s 
constitutional order.  This is why the BVerfG stepped in and took over the 
integrative function.  In what follows I will explain major BVerfG decisions 
in the aftermath of German unification neither doctrinally nor as acts of 
judicial politics but as attempts to integrate revolutionary achievements into 
the existing constitutional order under the GG through constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
C. Integration Through the BVerfg 
 
In the aftermath of German unification, the BVerfG decided a number 
of major cases that mark clear changes compared to what the Court had been 
saying prior to unification.  All changes are related to topics that featured 
prominently on the 1989 Revolution’s constitutional agenda. It started with 
Bodenreform I59 in 1991, where the Court upheld the confirmation of the so-
called Bodenreform-expropriations in Art. 143 III GG. Then came 
Nachtarbeit60 in 1992, where the Court established a government obligation 
to realize equality for women two years before the legislature managed to 
confirm that obligation in the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG.  It followed Abortion II61 
 
 57. See Art. 33 (3) RTD and some of the new states’ constitutions, see Jaggi, supra note 
6, 625. 
 58. That is particularly conspicuous in Scholz’s annotation of Art. 20a GG, where Scholz 
tries to interpret an anthropocentric orientation as well as a “Gesetzgebungsvorbehalt” into 
the provision, even though these were the points on which the CDU had compromised; see 
Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 20a paras. 38 et seq. and 41 et seq. 
 59. BVerfG Urteil v. 23.04.1991, 1 BvR 1170, 1174, 1175/90; NJW 1991, 1597 et seq. 
 60. BVerfG Urteil v. 28.01.1992, 1 BvR 1025/82, 1 BvL 16/83, 1 BvL 10/91, BVerfGE 
85, 191-214; see infra, 249 et seq. 
 61. BVerfG, Urteil v. 28.05.1993, 2 BvF 2/90, 2 BvF 4/92, 2 BvF 5/92, NJW 1993, 1751 
et seq.; see infra, 273 et seq. 
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in 1993, which gave up the requirement of criminal punishment of abortions 
during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy after counseling.  Finally, also 
in 1993, the Court introduced the protection of a tenant’s right to ownership 
in the rented apartment as property under Art. 14 I, 1 GG.62   
In all these cases, most authors have either denied any changes or have 
tried to explain them either doctrinally or as acts of judicial politics.  This is 
what I want to call the traditional understanding of the cases.  My thesis is 
that the traditional understanding overlooks the 1989 Revolution as an event 
with a substantial meaning for unified Germany’s constitutional law.  I will 
argue that the Court’s decisions are more realistically and more meaningfully 
explained as acts of integrating revolutionary achievements into the existing 
constitutional order under the GG through constitutional interpretation. 
 
I. Bodenreform 
 
One of the most hotly debated topics of German unification was the 
treatment of expropriations63 initiated by the Soviet occupying force on the 
territory of the Soviet occupation zone (later the GDR) between 1945 and 
1949 (the so-called Bodenreform-expropriations, or Bodenreform).64 
Viewing the big landowners in East Germany (the so-called Junkers) as 
pillars of the Nazi regime, the Soviet Union wanted to fundamentally 
restructure German society in the occupied territory after the end of World 
War II. One means to this end was what came to be known as the 
 
 62. BVerfG, Beschluss v. 26.05.1993, 1 BvR 208/93, BVerfGE 89, 1-14; see infra, 297 
et seq.  
 63. Many authors think the term “expropriations” does not properly describe the facts of 
the case. Such authors argue that expropriations are governmental takings for the common 
good while the Bodenreform-takings where directed against a specific class of property 
holders for political reasons.  They were thus “confiscations”; see, for example, Hans-Jürgen 
Papier, Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme der Eigentumsregelung im Einigungsvertrag, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1991, 193, 194; Hartmut Maurer, Die Eigentumsregelung 
im Einigungsvertrag, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 1992, 185; Otto Kimminich, Auswirkungen des 
Einigungsvertrags auf die Eigentumsgarantie des Grundgesetzes, in: Jörn Ipsen et al. (eds.), 
Verfassungsrecht im Wandel (1995), 82; Günther Felix, Vielleicht eine verdeckte 
Junkerabgabe, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1995, 2697. I use the term 
“expropriations” because that is the term the Court used. 
 64. The official name of these expropriations is: “Enteignungen auf 
besatzungsrechtlicher bzw. besatzungshoheitlicher Grundlage (1945 bis 1949)”; see 
Gemeinsame Erklärung der Regierungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen vom 15 Juni 1990 (Joint 
Declaration), reprinted in: Stern & Schmidt-Bleibtreu, supra note 14, 823 et seq. (indent No. 
1 on p. 823).  
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Bodenreform: the expropriation of both every estate exceeding 100 hectares 
(approximately 250 acres) as well as the property of everyone who was 
suspected to have supported the Nazis.65 3.2 million hectares, or one third of 
the available agricultural lands in the GDR, were thus expropriated.66  Peter 
Quint writes that “[m]any owners were forced to leave their property on a 
few days’ notice taking only the possessions that they could carry with 
them.”67  The expropriated owners were not compensated in the East, but 
those who made it to the West received compensatory payments from the 
West German government.68  Expropriated property was distributed, mostly 
in small plots of seven to nine hectares, among former landless peasants, 
workers, and refugees from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line.  As a 
result of the Bodenreform, around 550,000 people received around 2.2 
million hectares of land.69   
When German unification was on the horizon in early 1990, 
expropriated owners of Bodenreform-property began to lobby for a return of 
expropriated property.70  They were supported by the West German 
government, who wanted to undo these expropriations to the extent possible. 
The GDR government, on the other hand, worried about the rights of those 
who had received expropriated lands.  This prevented an agreement on 
property matters in the Treaty on the Currency, Economic, and Social Union 
of May 18, 1990.71  On June 15, 1990, however, the governments of East 
and West Germany signed a “Joint Declaration on the Regulation of Open 
Property Questions” (Joint Declaration),72 declaring Bodenreform-
expropriations irreversible and determining that a future legislature of 
unified Germany may decide on possible “governmental compensatory 
 
 65. I have taken this and the following from Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra note 28, 
125. 
 66. See Annex III to the UT, with annotations by Schmidt-Bleibtreu, in: Stern & Schmidt-
Bleibtreu, supra note 14, 826. 
 67. Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra note 28, 125.  
 68. The payments were based on the “Lastenausgleichsgesetz”; see Quint, The Imperfect 
Union, supra note 28, 125. 
 69. See Annex III to the UT, with annotations by Schmidt-Bleibtreu, in: Stern & Schmidt-
Bleibtreu, supra note 14, 826.  
 70. See Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra note 28, 127. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Anlage III zum Einigungsvertrag, Gemeinsame Erklärung der Regierungen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zur Regelung 
offener Vermögensfragen vom 15 Juni 1990, in: Stern & Schmidt-Bleibtreu, supra note 14, 
823 et seq.  
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payments.”73  The Joint Declaration, at the same time, determined a 
fundamentally different treatment of property expropriated by the GDR 
after 1949 (i.e. not Bodenreform-property), which “in principle” must 
be returned to the former owners or their heirs.74 The Joint Declaration 
equally applied the principle of restitution to property taken as a result 
of racial, political, religious, or ideological persecution by the Nazi 
regime between 1933 and 1945 in the GDR territory.75 The Joint 
Declaration was incorporated into the UT by Art. 41 (1) UT and into the 
GG by Art. 143 III GG.76   
Furious about this outcome, former owners of Bodenreform-property 
and their heirs, respectively, appealed to the BVerfG. Art. 143 III GG, they 
argued, violated, among others, the principles of human dignity and 
protection of property and thus did not fit into the GG.77  They argued that 
Art. 143 III GG was an “unconstitutional amendment of the GG” because it 
violated Art. 79 III GG, the so-called “eternity clause,”78 by violating the 
fundamental principles of human dignity and property. The plaintiffs 
concluded that the West German government was obliged to return 
Bodenreform-property to them. 
 
1. The Decisions 
 
On April 23, 1991, in Bodenreform I, the BVerfG’s First Senate held 
Art. 143 III GG constitutional.79 Procedurally, the Court accepted the 
 
 73. See Joint Declaration, Indent No. 1, in: Stern & Schmidt-Bleibtreu, supra note 14, 
823.  
 74. See Joint Declaration, Indent No. 2 et seq., in: Stern & Schmidt-Bleibtreu, supra note 
14, 823 et seq. 
 75. See Joint Declaration, id., in connection with § 1 (6) of the Act for the Settlement of 
Open Property Issues (Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen) (BGBl II 1990, 1159). 
 76. According to Art. 41 (3) UT, West Germany will not adopt any legal provisions that 
contradict the Joint Declaration. 
 77. See BVerfG, NJW 1991, 1598. 
 78. Art. 79 III GG prohibits constitutional amendments that “affect” fundamental 
principles of the GG.  It reads: “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the 
Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the 
principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be prohibited” (“Eine Änderung dieses 
Grundgesetzes, durch welche die Gliederung des Bundes in Länder, die grundsätzliche 
Mitwirkung der Länder bei der Gesetzgebung oder die in den Artikeln 1 und 20 
niedergelegten Grundsätze berührt werden, ist unzulässig”). 
 79. See BVerfG, Urteil v. 23.04.1991, 1 BvR 1170, 1174, 1175/90; NJW 1991, 1598 et 
seq. 
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plaintiffs’ direct appeal to the BVerfG because of the matter’s “general 
importance”.80  Substantively, the Court held that Art. 143 III GG did not 
violate Art. 79 III GG. 
Referring to “the principles laid down in Art. 1 and 20 [GG]”, Art. 
79 III GG withdraws the principles of human dignity and human rights, 
the principle of equality, as well as the basic principles of the rule of law 
and the social state from constitutional amendment.81  The Court argued 
that at the time when Art. 143 III GG (confirming the Bodenreform) had 
been adopted the former owners had not held an enforceable proprietary 
position that the Bodenreform’s confirmation could have deprived them 
of.82  According to the law in force on Soviet occupied territory at the 
time of the Bodenreform, the expropriations were considered legal or at 
least incontestable.83  The West German government, the Court argued, 
was not responsible for the expropriations since its power had neither 
factually nor legally extended to the territory on which the expropriations 
had taken place.84  The expropriations could not be evaluated according 
to the GG because the GG had not been in force at the time the 
expropriations occurred.85  Even West German law did not give the 
former owners an enforceable proprietary position because it accepted 
expropriations undertaken by another state as lawful as long as the 
expropriating state remained within the limits of its own authority 
(principle of territoriality).86  The Court argued that it did not need to 
decide whether the former owners had had public-international-law based 
claims against the Soviet occupying force, which might have been 
destroyed through Art. 143 III GG’s confirmation of the expropriations, 
because such claims would have been unenforceable and thus all but 
worthless.87 
 
 80. See § 90 II, 2 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (BVerfGG); see BVerfG, NJW 1991, 
1598. 
 81. See BVerfG, NJW 1991, 1599. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id.; the GG entered into force at the end of the day of May 23, 1949, see Art. 145 II 
GG. 
 86. BVerfG, NJW 1991, 1599, 1600. 
 87. See BVerG NJW 1991, 1600.  In a decision on Oct. 26, 2004, the Second Senate 
confirmed the First Senate’s holding. It held that West German government could not be held 
responsible for the Bodenreform-expropriations, public international law did not oblige West 
Germany to return Bodenreform-property, and West German government had been entitled 
to conclude that repealing Bodenreform-expropriations would have contradicted the goal of 
1 - FINAL - Jaggi - Revolutionary Reform in German .docx 6/5/2018  11:41 AM 
188 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:3 
The Court emphasized that, based on the social-state principle (Art. 20 
I GG), the West German government was obliged to balance people’s 
burdens resulting from WWII. Yet, the legislature had broad discretion in 
devising such a balance and was not obliged, as a matter of Art. 79 III GG, 
to return property expropriated by a foreign power.88 
Confirming Bodenreform-expropriations but not expropriations 
undertaken before 1945 and after 1949, the Court argued, did not violate the 
principle of equality as protected by Art. 79 III GG because the West German 
government was entitled to assume that confirming Bodenreform-
expropriations was necessary to get the Soviet Union and East Germany to 
agree with German unification.89  The Court held, however, that the principle 
of equality prevented the legislature from excluding all compensation for 
Bodenreform-expropriations.90 
When the plaintiffs asserted that the Court, in Bodenreform I, had 
decided on the basis of incorrect facts, the BVerfG’s First Senate, on April 
18, 1996, handed down another decision on the constitutionality of the 
Bodenreform’s confirmation (Bodenreform II) in which it fully confirmed its 
first decision.91  
In a third decision, the Court’s First Senate decided a case brought 
against provisions of a law regulating compensatory payments for victims of 
Bodenreform-expropriations.92  The Court held that West Germany’s 
obligation to pay compensations for financial losses that had been caused by 
a government that was not bound by the GG could not be based on specific 
basic rights of the GG, but could result from the GG’s social-state principle 
found in Art. 20 I, 28 I GG.93  Regulation of such compensation must comply 
with the rule of law and the principle of equality.94  The social-state 
principle, the Court argued, required everybody to participate in burdens that 
 
German unification; see BVerfG Beschluss v. 26.10.2004, 2 BvR 955/00, 1038/01, beck-
online version, BeckRS 2004 26155, p. 15, ind. 2.  For a legitimate critique of the Second 
Senate’s majority opinion, see Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff’s dissent in BVerfG, id., pp. 22 et seq. 
Lübbe-Wolff argues that the Second Senate’s opinion is superfluous because the First Senate 
had already decided all relevant questions and the Second Senate did not reach different 
conclusions. 
 88. See BVerfG, NJW 1991, 1600. 
 89. Id. at 1600, 1601. 
 90. Id. at 1601. 
 91. BVerfG, Beschluss v. 18.04.1996, 1 BvR 1452/90, 1459/90, 2031/94; NJW 1996, 
1666 et seq. 
 92. BVerfG, Urteil v. 22.11.2000, 1 BvR 2307/94, VIZ 2001, 16 et seq. 
 93. BVerfG, VIZ 2001, 18. 
 94. Id. at 18, 19. 
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resulted from a common destiny and that, more or less by chance, only 
affected individual citizens.  The legislature enjoys broad discretion in 
compensating for such burdens and may consider its financial capacities and 
future obligations, among other things, in determining the appropriate 
compensation.95  Based on these principles, the Court held the contested 
provisions constitutional.96 
Finally, even the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) confirmed 
the BVerfG’s holding that the West German government was not responsible 
for expropriations undertaken in the Soviet occupation zone.97  Therefore, 
the ECHR held that it had no jurisdiction to examine these expropriations’ 
legality.98  It further held that the former owners had had no claims at the 
time of German unification that could have been protected by the European 
Convention on Human Rights and that West German government might have 
violated by confirming the Bodenreform-expropriations.99 
 
2. Traditional Understanding 
 
The traditional understanding of these decisions may be divided into 
polemical, doctrinal, and political. 
The decisions’ polemical critique shows the extremism with which 
some authors engaged in the debate.  Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, for example, 
calls the expropriated property “bloody booty” and the new owners 
“thieves”.100  He implies that the Bodenreform-expropriations were part of a 
broader Soviet strategy aiming at the economic, social, psychological, and 
physical “extermination”101 of the German “Junkers”, and that “the Junker” 
may well be regarded as “the Jew” of the German east under Soviet 
occupation.102  Another author refers to the Bible (“thou shalt not steal”) to 
 
 95. Id. at 18. 
 96. BVerfG, VIZ 2001, 19 et seq. 
 97. ECHR, NJW 2005, 2532, 2533. 
 98. Id. at 2533. 
 99. ECHR, NJW 2005, 2533 et seq. 
 100. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, Das Bodenreform-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 
Analyse und Kritik, in Stern, infra note 109, 3. 
 101. He actually uses the word “Vernichtung”, see Vitzthum, supra note 100, 14. 
 102. Id.; in an attempt to distance himself from his own statement, Vitzthum argues that 
his comparison of the extermination of “the Junkers” with the extermination of “the Jews” 
would be “much too daring” (“viel zu gewagt”).  Another author who eagerly compares the 
Bodenreform-expropriations with measures of the Nazi regime is Walter Leisner, Das 
Bodenreform-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts - Kriegsfolge- und 
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attack the constitutionality of the compensation rules and the BVerfG’s 
decision.103 
Many authors deny that the Bodenreform’s confirmation was a conditio 
sine qua non for German unification.104  They doubt the Soviet Union’s 
insistence on the expropriations’ confirmation as a prerequisite for its 
acceptance of German unification.105  Some even accuse the West German 
government of lying to the Court about the Soviet Union’s insistence on the 
Bodenreform’s indefeasibility.106  Another argument is that the GDR was 
not powerful enough to impose conditions on West Germany.107  Yet, after 
trying to undermine the factual basis for the government’s case, the authors 
often imply that, from a constitutional point of view, the Court was 
eventually right to defer to the government’s decision to accept the 
Bodenreform’s confirmation.108  Some argue the Court should have fully and 
openly based its decisions on the principle of judicial self-restraint since that 
would have increased the decisions’ pacifying effect.109  
Some authors criticize the Court for not sufficiently specifying and 
applying Art. 79 III GG’s requirements and limits in general and the 
principles of human dignity (Art. 1 I GG) and equality (Art. 3 I GG) in 
particular. 110  One author argues that the Bodenreform-expropriations were 
acts of arbitrariness, inhumanity, and brutality and, as such, violated the 
human-dignity core inherent in the protection of property.111  Having thus 
turned the taking of property into a violation of the principle of human 
dignity, the argument considers the Bodenreform-expropriations violations 
 
Eigentumsentscheidung, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1991, 1569 and id., 
Verfassungswidriges Verfassungsrecht, Nach dem Bodenreform-Urteil des BVerfG, Die 
Öffentliche Verwaltung (DÖV) 1992, 435. 
 103. Klaus Märker, Der Staatsräson verpflichtet! Zur Entscheidung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts über die Verfassungsmäßighkeit des Entschädigungs - und 
Ausgleichsleistungsgesetzes, Zeitschrift für Vermögens- und Immobilienrecht (VIZ) 2001, 
233, 238. 
 104. See, for example, Kimminich, supra note 63, 84 et seq. with further references. 
 105. Id.; Maurer, supra note 63, 189.  
 106. Felix, supra note 63, 2697 et seq. 
 107. See Maurer, supra note 63, 189 note 35; Johannes Wasmuth, Restitutionsausschluss 
und Willkürverbot, Deutsch-Deutsche Rechtszeitschrift (DtZ) 1993, 335. 
 108. See Vitzthum, supra note 100, 11. 
 109. Stern commenting on Vitzthum, in: Klaus Stern (ed.), Deutsche Wiedervereinigung, 
Band II, Zur Wiederherstellung der inneren Einheit, Teil 1, Vermögensfragen öffentlicher 
Dienst, Universitäten (1992), 36. 
 110. Maurer, supra note 63, 190 et seq.; Vitzthum, supra note 100, 13. 
 111. Vitzthum, supra note 100, 13 et seq. 
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of Art. 1 I GG and thus of Art. 79 III GG. As regards the principle of equality, 
it is argued that neither the Soviet Union’s nor the GDR’s insistence on the 
Bodenreform’s confirmation suffice as a good reason for the different 
treatment of Bodenreform-expropriations on the one hand and expropriations 
before 1945 and after 1949 on the other.112  Both arguments result in the new 
Art. 143 III GG’s unconstitutionality. 
Other authors consider the Bodenreform a violation of public 
international law.113  Under the Hague Convention, they argue, the USSR 
was not authorized to take private property in occupied Germany.114 They 
conclude that the West German government was obliged to return the 
expropriated lands to the former owners.115 
Finally there are authors who anticipated and approve of the Court’s 
doctrinal arguments.116  In particular, they argue that Art. 79 III GG in 
connection with the basic principles of human dignity and the rule of law do 
not oblige West Germany to undo property violations by other states.117  
They say, moreover, that the West German government was constitutionally 
entitled to treat Bodenreform-expropriations and expropriations before 1945 
and after 1949 differently because the government stayed within the limits 
of its broad discretion in political questions when it assumed that confirming 
the Bodenreform was necessary to achieve German unification.118 
Other authors characterize the Court’s decisions as acts of judicial 
politics.  Quint, for example, writes, “. . . the Constitutional Court sought to 
settle one of the most important constitutional and political questions arising 
from unification. In so doing, the Court seemed to employ a mediating 
technique in which it chose no clear winners or losers but rather sought to 
create a political structure that embodied a compromise.”119  Others accuse 
the Court of trying to protect state finances.120  
 
 112. Maurer, supra note 63, 190 et seq. 
 113. See, for example, Kimminich, supra note 63, 80; Wasmuth, supra note 107, 334 et 
seq. with further references; von der Beck, 247 et seq.  
 114. Otto Kimminich, Die Eigentumsgarantie im Prozess der Wiedervereinigung: Zur 
Bestandskraft der agrarischen Bodenrechtsordnung der DDR (1990), 76, 77.  
 115. Id. at 77.  
 116. Papier, supra note 63, 193 et seq. with further references; Hans Jürgen Papier, in 
Theodor Maunz & Günther Dürig, Grundgesetz, Art. 14 paras. 273-277. 
 117. Papier, supra note 63, 196. 
 118. Papier, supra note 63, 196, 197. 
 119. Quint, supra note 28, 138.  
 120. Märker, supra note 103, 234, 236, 241; Karl Doehring & Peter Ruess, Die 
Entscheidung des BVerfG zur Entschädigung von Opfern der Bodenreform im Lichte der 
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I think the traditional understanding is unable to convincingly explain 
the Court’s decisions.  The doctrinal understanding, be it critical or 
affirmative of the Court’s decisions, appears too technical and too much 
guided by the desired outcome.  The Court’s holding that West Germany was 
not responsible for the Bodenreform since its power had not extended to the 
territory in which the expropriations had taken place is a case in point. If one 
would focus not on the expropriations but instead on the Bodenreform’s 
confirmation, West Germany was responsible.  It was the West German 
government who decided to confirm these expropriations.  So, would it have 
been indefensible to argue that the Bodenreform’s confirmation violated Art. 
79 III GG because it corroborated a situation that had been brought about by 
fundamental human rights violations?  Another example is the Court’s 
holding that the West German government could assume that the USSR and 
the GDR had insisted on the expropriations’ confirmation as a condition for 
German unification. In fact, official statements on this matter are 
contradictory.121  Gorbachev, for example, said that “. . . [o]n my level as 
President of the USSR, that question was not dealt with, and neither can it 
be said that there was an alternative: either the restitution or the Big 
Treaty.”122  Did the Court really examine whether or not the West German 
government had been evidently wrong to assume that the Soviet Union had 
insisted on the expropriations’ confirmation?  Wouldn’t the Court have had 
to hear Gorbachev as a witness in order to verify Staatssekretär Dr. Kastrup’s 
statement that the Soviet Union would have refused to sign the Two-plus-
Four Treaty without a prior confirmation of the Bodenreform by West 
Germany?123  These examples suffice to show that, based on doctrinal 
arguments, the Court might well have come out the other way.   
So, why did the Court decide as it did? Judicial politics after all?  The 
attempt to find a political middle ground to facilitate unification and give 
East Germans the feeling that at least some of their concerns were taken into 
account?  Another attempt to bolster the Court’s popularity and reaffirm its 
 
EMRK – Rechtssicherheit oder mit Sicherheit Unrecht?, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
(NJW) 2001, 640, 642, all commenting on the Court’s EALG decision of Nov. 22, 2000. 
 121. See Maurer, supra note 63, 189; Felix, supra note 63, 2697 et seq.; Kimminich, supra 
note, 84 et seq. 
 122. That was Gorbachev’s answer on July 5, 1994, to a question by the Oxford historian 
Prof. Norman Stone whether it “. . . is true or not that the USSR, during the negotiations over 
German unification, has made the prohibition of a restitution (a return of property that was 
confiscated during that time [1945-1949]) an unalterable condition?  Is it true that you in 
particular insisted on the prohibition of such restitutions in the future?”, quoted in: Felix, 
supra note 63, 2697, 2698. 
 123. See BVerfG, NJW 1996, 1666, 1670. 
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institutional standing as a voice of reason?  To assume that would be giving 
up too quickly on the possibility to explain the Court’s decisions in terms of 
constitutional interpretation.   
The traditional understanding’s problem is that, even though some of 
its arguments take history into account, it ignores the 1989 Revolution’s 
impact on unified Germany’s constitutional law.  In what follows I will argue 
that the Court’s decisions can only be understood once one takes into account 
that, by the time the Court decided, there had been a successful revolution in 
East Germany, the Bodenreform’s confirmation had been an important 
revolutionary achievement, and the UT had transferred this achievement to 
unified Germany, where the institutions were now faced with the challenge 
of integrating it into the existing structures of West German constitutional 
law. Unified Germany’s federal legislature had tried to meet this challenge 
by adopting Art. 143 III GG, but the Court saw that a proper integration of 
Art. 143 III GG into the existing constitutional order required the 
compensation of former owners. 
 
3. My understanding: the decisions as acts of integration 
 
My thesis is that the Court’s Bodenreform decisions are more 
realistically and meaningfully understood, not as acts of doctrinalism or 
judicial politics, but as acts of constitutional interpretation with which the 
BVerfG self-consciously confronted the revolutionary achievement of 
confirming the Bodenreform and tried to integrate it into existing structures 
of West German constitutional law. 
During the 1960s most of the Bodenreform-lands had been 
concentrated in so-called LPGs,124 even though, formally, individual farmers 
and members of the LPGs had remained owners of these lands.  The owners’ 
right to dispose of this property, however, had been strongly limited.125  As 
a result of the 1989 Revolution, the lands were turned back into “real” private 
property by repealing all former limitations and declaring the GDR Civil 
Code applicable.126  When the GDR was headed towards German 
 
 124. Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften (Farmers’ Cooperatives). 
 125. The property was termed “Working Property” (“Arbeitseigentum”) and could, for 
example, not be sold but, under certain conditions, be passed on to heirs. For details, see 
Steffen Siewert, Zum Eigentum an den Bodenreform-Grundstücken, Neue Justiz (NJ) 1992, 
155 et seq. 
 126. See §1 Gesetz über die Rechte der Eigentümer von Grundstücken aus der 
Bodenreform v. 06.03.1990 (GBl. DDR I 1990, 134); see also Dieter Dörr, EMRK - 
Bodenreform, Report on the EGMR’s decision (Section III.), Urteil vom 22.01.2004 - 
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unification, it had quickly become clear the people’s Bodenreform-property 
would soon be challenged by the former owners, mostly West Germans. The 
East Germans’ call for protection of property had therefore increasingly 
included a call for confirming the Bodenreform.  This call had caused 
institutional reactions. Wolfgang Ullman, member of an early reform-
government in the GDR (the so-called Modrow “government of national 
responsibility”), said that  
 
as a member of the [Modrow] government, I had to consider 
how we would handle the issues that resulted from World War 
II. I was of the opinion that one consideration must be that certain 
things would not be undone. For me, one of these things had 
always been the Bodenreform and the expropriation of groups in 
society that had contributed very significantly to Hitler’s seizure 
of power and to the preparation of World War II.127  
 
Ullmann himself, a prominent representative of the citizens’ movement, 
had urged the Modrow government to ask the Soviet Union to insist on the 
irreversibility of Bodenreform-expropriations during the Two-Plus-Four-
Treaty negotiations.128  The Modrow government, says Ullmann, acted in 
accordance with his request.129   
A further institutional reaction to, and legal manifestation of, the East 
Germans’ call for the protection of Bodenreform-property was an early draft 
constitution which had declared the Bodenreform “inviolable.”  The goal had 
been “to preserve social peace and to secure vested social rights” of GDR 
citizens.130  Ulrich Preuß, a West German law professor advising the 
revolutionaries, said the provision must be considered “a gesture of self-
confidence [by the East Germans], which West Germany should wisely 
respect.”131  Statements by the first freely elected GDR government also 
reflect the East Germans’ will regarding Bodenreform. Prime Minister De 
Maiziere argued vigorously in favor of confirming the Bodenreform in order 
 
46720/99, 72203/01, 7255/01 (Jahn u.a./Deutschland), Juristische Schulung (JuS) 2004, 808 
et seq. 
 127. Wolfgang Ullmann, Verfassung und Parlament, 23 (1992). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Klaus Michael Rogner, Der Verfassungsentwurf des Zentralen Runden Tisches 
der DDR, 98 (1993). 
 131. Ulrich Preuß, Auf der Suche nach der Zivilgesellschaft, in: Bernd Guggenberg & 
Tine Stein (eds.), Die Verfassungsdiskussion im Jahr der Deutschen Einheit, 365, 366 (1991). 
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to prevent social unrest in the GDR after unification.132  The first freely 
elected East German parliament agreed.133 
The West German government had respected the East Germans’ will in 
both the Joint Declaration of June 15, 1990, and in the UT. The West German 
legislature had implemented that will with the necessary 2/3 majority in the 
new Art. 143 III GG.   
When considerable arguments were made that Art. 143 III GG did not 
fit into the GG, it became the BVerfG’s task to properly integrate the 
revolutionary achievement into the existing constitutional order under the 
GG.   
The Court’s basis for integration was Art. 79 III GG. Since the 
Bodenreform’s confirmation had been manifested in a constitutional 
amendment (Art. 143 III GG), the question of whether or not it fit into the 
GG had to be examined on the basis of the GG’s most fundamental principles 
as listed in Art. 79 III GG. According to Art. 79 III GG, constitutional 
amendments must not violate these core principles. 
Within its Art. 79 III GG examination, the Court self-consciously refers 
to the respect that West Germany owes to the revolutionaries’ will and makes 
this a core argument for Art. 143 III GG’s integration into the existing 
constitutional order under the GG.  The Court argues that: 
 
If the unity should be realized in an orderly fashion and be 
accepted by the people of the GDR as a result of their self-
determination, the West German government, in the 
negotiations, had to take seriously the will of the first 
democratically elected representation of the [GDR] people and 
the government elected by it.  To ignore their wishes would, in 
any case, have contradicted the respect that West Germany owed 
to the people in the GDR and could have considerably 
endangered the orderly process of reunification.134 
 
The argument shows that the factor requiring, and thus constitutionally 
justifying, the Bodenreform’s confirmation was neither the GDR’s 
 
 132. Government Declaration, supra note 54, pp. 8, 18; BVerfG, NJW 1991, 1601; 
BVerfG, NJW 1996, 1669; supra, 147. 
 133. See Protocol of the 15th Meeting of the Volkskammer on 17.06.1990, reprinted in: 
Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 179 et seq., petition by Abg. Holz (DBD/DFD) on 
p. 199, de Maiziere’s response on pp. 202 et seq., and finally the VK’s decision to refrain 
from writing the confirmation of the Bodenreform-expropriations into the VGG on p. 203. 
 134. BVerfG, NJW 1996, 1668, 1669 (my italics). 
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contractual bargaining power nor its ability to prevent unification. It was “the 
respect that West Germany owed to the people in the GDR”.  Disrespect of 
that will might have reactivated the revolutionary people and might have 
developed into “social dynamite of the first order” endangering German 
unification.135  
Finally, the Court activates the GG’s core principles, i.e., the social-
state principle, the rule of law, and the principle of equality, in order to 
integrate the East Germans’ will to confirm the Bodenreform into the 
existing constitutional order under the GG. Based on these core principles, 
the Court develops a constitutional government obligation to provide for 
compensatory payments to former owners of Bodenreform property.  This 
obligation to compensate former owners is a means to fit the Bodenreform’s 
confirmation into the GG. 
 
II. Gender Equality 
 
Another hotly debated topic during the 1989 Revolution and the process 
of German unification was gender equality.  As I have shown, individual 
empowerment through, among others, the establishment of real-social 
instead of only formal-legal equality for women was an important 
revolutionary achievement.136  This achievement was transferred to unified 
Germany through Art. 5 UT and Art. 31 (1) UT, according to which unified 
Germany’s legislature should further develop legislation facilitating the 
equal protection of men and women.137  All new state constitutions include 
provisions explicitly establishing an active government obligation to make 
gender equality a social reality.138  On this basis, in 1994 the GVK proposed, 
and unified Germany’s legislature adopted, a new sentence 2 to Art. 3 II GG 
stating that the state shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights 
for women and men and take steps to eliminate existing disadvantages.139   
Interestingly, most authors argue that the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG did not 
bring any change.  Scholz, for example, writes that the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG 
 
 135. Id. at 1669. 
 136. See Ackerman, supra 2, at 707.  
 137. See Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 3 Abs. 2 para. 58. 
 138. See Constitutions of Brandenburg, Art. 12 III, 48 III, 2; Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania, Art. 13; Saxony, Art. 8; Saxony-Anhalt, Art. 34; Thuringia, Art. 2 II; and Berlin, 
Art. 10 III. 
 139. See supra, 214. 
1 - FINAL - Jaggi - Revolutionary Reform in German .docx 6/5/2018  11:41 AM 
2018] Revolutionary Reform in German Constitutional Law 197 
is only a “clarification” of what the BVerfG had already decided.140  Even 
the Court itself, in Feuerwehrabgabe,141 calls the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG an 
explicit clarification of what it had already decided in Nachtarbeit in 
1992.142  Does that mean the Court already knew in 1992 what the legislature 
would do in 1994?  What exactly did the Court say in 1992?   
In Nachtarbeit143 the Court, for the first time, said that according to Art. 
3 II GG, the legislature was not only authorized but constitutionally obliged 
to realize gender equality as a fact of social reality.144  Prior to that decision, 
e.g. in Altersruhegeld (1987), the Court had considered the legislature 
merely authorized to realize gender equality and had explicitly left open 
whether the government was also obliged to do so.145  So, the real change 
seems to have taken place in 1992: from the government’s constitutional 
authorization to realize gender equality to its constitutional obligation to do 
so. If that is true, the question is: why did the Court change its approach to 
gender equality?  And why already in 1992 and not after the GG had been 
amended in 1994? 
There are authors who simply deny any change in the Court’s approach 
to gender equality in 1992.  Michael Sachs, for example, argues that the 
Court’s statement on Art. 3 II GG in Nachtarbeit merely summarized its 
former holdings.146  Others, while more exact and differentiating in their 
reading of what the Court said in 1992, still do not answer what exactly 
changed and why.147 
My thesis is twofold: (i) the Court’s approach to gender equality 
changed profoundly in 1992; and (ii) the reason for this change is the 1989 
Revolution, its constitutional achievement with respect to gender equality, 
and the Court’s attempt to integrate this achievement into the existing 
constitutional order under the GG.  I will argue that, when the Court decided 
 
 140. Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 3 Abs. 2 GG para. 71. 
 141. BVerfG Beschluss v. 24.01.1995, 1 BvL 18/93, 1 BvL 5/94, 1 BvL 6/94, 1 BvL 7/94, 
1 BvR 403/94, 1 BvR 569/94, BVerfGE 92, 91-122. 
 142. BVerfGE 92, 91, juris-version, rec. 68. 
 143. BVerfG Urteil v. 28.01.1992, 1 BvR 1025/82, 1 BvL 16/83, 1 BvL 10/91, BVerfGE 
85, 191-214. 
 144. BVerfGE 85, 191, juris-version, rec. 53. 
 145. BVerfG Beschluss v. 28.01.1987, 1 BvR 455/82, BVerfGE 74, 163-182, juris-
version, rec. 45, 46. 
 146. Michael Sachs, Anmerkung zum BVerfG Urteil v. 28.01.1992, Juristische Schulung 
(JuS) (1992) 876. 
 147. See Manfred Löwisch, Anmerkung zum BverfG Urteil v. 28.01.1992, Juristenzeitung 
(JZ) (1992) 917 et seq. 
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Altersruhegeld in 1987, it was still able to leave open whether or not the 
government was constitutionally obliged to realize gender equality. In 1987, 
the Court still lived in the old, strongly conservative West Germany.  West 
Germany’s constitutional order was determined by a, generally, formal-legal 
approach to gender equality under which authorizing the legislature to 
compensate women for past discrimination was the most the Court 
considered itself authorized to do.  In 1992 that was no longer the case 
because a profound change had taken place in 1989/1990. The 1989 
Revolution had demanded, among other things, a constitutional government 
obligation to realize gender equality.148  Unified Germany’s legislature, 
whom Art. 5 and Art. 31 (1) UT had obliged to “further develop” the law on 
gender equality, was politically deadlocked.149  In this situation, it was the 
Court who felt obliged to take on the issue.  It did so in an obiter dictum in 
Nachtarbeit, where it stated what it considered to be the 1989 Revolution’s 
impact on unified Germany’s constitutional law.  This explains why the 
Court, without possessing a crystal ball, was able to say in 1992 what the 
legislature would add to the GG only in 1994. 
In what follows, I will analyze the change in the Court’s approach to 
gender equality from 1987 to 1992, outline the traditional understanding of 
that change, and then explain my own understanding. 
 
1. The Decisions: Altersruhegeld (1987) and Nachtarbeit 
(1992) 
 
Prior to 1987, the Court’s approach to gender equality based on Art. 3 
II, III GG was, generally, a formal one.150 As long as an unequal treatment 
was formulated in gender-neutral terms, it was generally considered 
constitutional.  If not, it was generally considered unconstitutional, unless 
objective biological or functional differences between the sexes justified the 
 
 148. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 178 et seq. 
 149. See supra, pp. 6 et seq. 
 150. Ute Sacksofsky, Das Grundrecht auf Gleichberechtigung, Eine rechtsdogmatische 
Untersuchung zu Artikel 3 Abs. 2 des Grundgesetzes, 26 et seq. (1991); Claudia Eckertz-
Höfer, in Erhard Denninger et al. (eds.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Reihe Alternativkommentare, Band 1, Art. 3 Abs. 2, 3 paras. 26 et seq. (3rd ed. 
2001); Kerstin Schweizer, Der Gleichberechtigungssatz - Neue Form, alter Inhalt?,110 et seq. 
(1998); for the few exceptions to this principle, see Sacksofsky, id., 95 et seq. and Schweizer, 
id., 112; for an overview of adjudication and literature, see Sacksofsky, id., 23 et seq. and 101 
et seq. 
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unequal treatment.151  The Court later modified this formula, so that gender-
based differentiations were justified if they were indispensable to solve 
problems that, according to their nature, could only occur with either men or 
women.152  Applying this formula, the Court focused on making sure that 
the law was facially gender neutral.  The Court was, generally, not concerned 
about laws that were facially gender neutral but still had discriminatory 
effects in practice.153  Despite the interpretive rule that provisions with 
different texts must not be assumed to have identical meaning, both the 
BVerfG and most authors interpreted Art. 3 II GG as merely confirming the 
prohibition of gender discrimination stated in Art. 3 III GG154. 
The Court’s formal approach to gender equality has been criticized for 
a long time.  As early as 1974, it was F.J. Säcker who argued that Art. 3 II 
GG in combination with the social-state clause imposed a government 
obligation to adopt necessary measures to make equality of women a social 
reality.155  Karl Heinrich Friauf stated in 1981 that Art. 3 II GG, interpreted 
in the light of the social-state principle, obliged the government to actively 
further equality for women.156  However, led by Manfred Löwisch, most 
authors insisted that Art. 3 II GG merely stipulated formal-legal equality.157 
Accordingly, Art. 3 II GG only prohibited gender-based legal 
differentiations without including an order to actively promote women’s real 
emancipation.158  Based on this principle, many authors in the 1980s’ 
considered structural social discrimination against women, such as unequal 
distribution of work in the family, a purely private matter with which 
 
 151. That had been the standard test since BVerfGE 3, 225, 242; 52,369, 374; 63, 181, 
194; 68, 384, 390; 71, 224, 229; see Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 27; Schweizer, 
supra note 150, 111. 
 152. Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 31. 
 153. Schweizer, supra note 150, 112; Sacksofsky, supra note 150, 27. 
 154. Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, paras. 3 and 26; Sacksofsky, supra note 24 and 150; 
Schweizer, supra note 110 and 150; Art. 3 II GG read: “Men and women shall have equal 
rights”; Art. 3 III GG read: “No person shall be favored or disfavored because of sex, . . . .” 
 155. F.J. Säcker, Referat auf dem 50. Deutschen Juristentag zum Thema: Welche 
rechtlichen Massnahmen sind vordringlich, um die tatsächliche Gleichstellung der Frauen mit 
den Männern im Arbeitsleben zu gewährleisten?, Verhandlungen des 50. Deutschen 
Juristentages, 1974, Band II, L 9, p. 25. 
 156. Karl Heinrich Friauf, Gleichberechtigung der Frau als Verfassungsauftrag, 
Rechtsgutachten erstattet im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums des Innern, 29 (1981). 
 157. Manfred Löwisch, Referat auf dem 50, Deutschen Juristentag zum Thema: Welche 
rechtlichen Massnahmen sind vordringlich, um die tatsächliche Gleichstellung der Frauen mit 
den Männern im Arbeitsleben zu gewährleisten?, Verhandlungen des 50. Deutschen 
Juristentages, 1974, Band. I, D 11, p. 42; Schweizer, supra note 150, 116. 
 158. Id. 
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government must not interfere.159  
The Court’s view of Art. 3 II GG started to change in 1987 with 
Altersruhegeld.  Here, for the first time, the Court explicitly attributed 
constitutional relevance not only to legal but also to factual, social 
discrimination against women.160  The Court examined under Art. 3 II GG a 
legal provision according to which women were entitled to pensions from 
the statutory pension insurance upon their 60s birthday, while men needed 
to be older.161  The Court held the provision constitutional and stated that the 
legislature was constitutionally authorized to compensate women in a 
generalizing way162 for such factual discriminations that could be traced 
back to biological differences.163  Such compensatory measures, the Court 
argued, could not be considered gender-based discrimination.164  Reasons 
that may justify women’s preferential treatment, according to the Court, 
were social factors that typically disadvantaged women, such as women’s 
dual burden of child-raising and professional work, educational 
disadvantages, lower salaries, and fewer career opportunities.  All these 
factors, the Court argued, were typically rooted in traditional perceptions of 
women as mothers, which could be traced back to biological differences.165 
In the same decision, the Court took up another question that it had not 
decided previously: was the legislature constitutionally not only authorized 
but obliged to actively generate the prerequisites for “factual gender 
equality”?166  The Court emphasized that, so far, the principle of gender 
equality had been applied mainly as an individual defense against 
discriminations by the government.  Explicitly referring to Friauf’s 1981 
study, the Court pointed out that it had recently been discussed whether Art. 
3 II GG also established a positive government obligation to actively 
 
 159. See Schweizer, supra note 150, 117, 118 with further references; note the similar 
differentiation between state and society in this argument and in the majority’s argument in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 160. So, too, Juliane Kokott, Zur Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau - Deutsches 
Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
(NJW) 1995, 1050, 1054; Sacksofsky, supra note 150, 74 et seq.; Schweizer, supra note 150, 
113; Christine Fuchsloch, Das Verbot der mittelbaren Geschlechtsdiskriminierung, 
Ableitung, Analyse und exemplarische Anwendung auf staatliche 
Berufsausbildungsförderung, 77 et seq. (1995). 
 161. BVerfGE 74, 163, juris-version, rec. 1. 
 162. That means without the need of evidence for discrimination in a specific case. 
 163. BVerfGE 74, 163, juris-version, rec. 46; Schweizer, supra note 150, 113. 
 164. Id. 
 165. BVerfGE 74, 163, juris-version, rec. 49. 
 166. Id. at rec. 46. 
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promote the realization of gender equality.167  Yet, the Court explicitly left 
the question open because its decision did not depend upon it.168 
The next time the Court took up the question was in 1992 in 
Nachtarbeit. And despite the fact that the Court’s decision, again, did not 
depend upon it, the Court nonetheless decided to answer the question in an 
obiter dictum.  The Court stated that Art. 3 II GG’s additional content, i.e., 
the content that went beyond the prohibition of gender discrimination that 
was already stated in Art. 3 III GG, was “that it postulates an order to equal 
protection and it expands this order to apply also to social reality.”169  What 
exactly does that mean?  Some authors argue, as I have mentioned before, 
that the Court only summarized what it had already said in Altersruhegeld 
and earlier decisions.170  Others think the Court “only assigned to the 
legislature a set of questions and considerations to decide on.”171  If that was 
true there would be no need to examine why the Court did what it did.  A 
mere summary of what had already been said before or the assignment to the 
legislature of a set of questions and considerations would not justify further 
analysis.   
I think these authors are wrong. Prior to Nachtarbeit the Court had 
never said that Art. 3 II GG’s additional content was “an order to equal 
protection” and an expansion of that order to include “social reality.”  The 
decisions the Court cited in Nachtarbeit do not contain such statements and 
none of them says anything about a government obligation to actively realize 
gender equality.  Moreover, in a case decided later that year 
(Kindererziehungszeiten, decided on July 7, 1992),172 the Court explicitly 
clarified what it had meant in Nachtarbeit with the expression “order to 
gender equality” was a constitutional government obligation to actively realize 
 
 167. Id. at rec. 45. 
 168. Id. at rec. 46. 
 169. BVerfGE 85, 191, juris-version, rec. 53; the original reads: “Der über das 
Diskriminierungsverbot des Art. 3 Abs. 3 GG hinausreichende Regelungsgehalt von Art. 3 
Abs. 2 GG besteht darin, daß er ein Gleichberechtigungsgebot aufstellt und dieses auch auf 
die gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit erstreckt.“ 
 170. Sachs, supra note 146, 876; see supra, 33; this view must be distinguished from, for 
example, Di Fabio’s view, according to which a “profound and systematically highly 
important change in the interpretation of basic rights” has occurred, but who holds this change 
to be deeply wrong; see Udo Di Fabio, Die Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau, Archiv des 
öffentlichen Rechts (AöR) 1997, 404, 408 et seq., 441 et seq. 
 171. Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 3 Abs. 2 GG para. 64.  
 172. BVerfG Urteil v. 07.07.1992, 1 BvL 51/86, 1 BvL 50/87, 1 BvR 873/90, 1 BvR 
761/91, BVerfGE 87, 1-48. 
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gender equality.173  It is undisputed that the Court had never said anything like 
that before Nachtarbeit.174  
The decision shows that the argument according to which the Court did 
not decide on a government obligation to realize gender equality but, by way 
of obiter dictum, only assigned questions and considerations to the 
legislature175 is only partly true.  To be sure, the Court used an obiter dictum 
to establish the new government obligation, which was thus not part of the 
holding in the technical sense.  Nonetheless, the Court stated a clear 
government obligation and did not merely “assign a set of questions and 
considerations”.  This can no longer be doubted, at least since the Court 
explicitly confirmed it in Erziehungszeiten.176   
It can thus safely be said that Nachtarbeit profoundly changed the 
Court’s interpretation of Art. 3 II GG by reading into it, for the first time, a 
government obligation to actively realize gender equality.177 
The remaining question is: why did the Court do that? Unfortunately, 
the Court does not explain itself. It generated its obiter dictum on the new 
meaning of Art. 3 II GG in Nachtarbeit out of thin air. In what follows I will 
therefore first present and criticize the traditional understanding of the 
change in order to then present my own view. 
 
 2.Traditional Understanding 
 
The traditional understanding can be divided into doctrinal and judicial-
politics arguments. 
The traditional doctrinal view argues that, like every basic right, Art. 3 
II GG has an objective value core, which, in connection with the social-state 
 
 173. The Court explicitly cited Nachtarbeit in support of a statement according to which 
“the clearly higher concernment of women causes the legislature’s obligation [Pflicht] 
emanating from Art. 3 II GG to work towards an equalization of the living conditions of 
women and men”; see BVerfGE 87, 1, juris-version, rec. 140 (my italics). 
 174. Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Bremen in 1987 had concluded from the BVerfG’s 
holdings that Art. 3 II GG comprised not only an individual defensive right but also an 
“objective value decision” (“objektive Wertentscheidung”) and an “objective value measure” 
(“objektiver Wertmaßstab”), respectively; see VG Bremen, NJW 1988, 3224 et seq., 3225; 
not even the VG Bremen, however, asserted that the BVerfG had explicitly stated a 
constitutional obligation of the state to actively realize gender equality. 
 175. Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 3 Abs. 2 GG para. 64. 
 176. BVerGE 87, 1, juris-version, rec. 140. 
 177. This conclusion is shared, for example, by Schweizer, supra note 150, 114; and Di 
Fabio, supra note 170, 408 et seq., 441. 
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principle, establishes a government obligation to actively realize gender 
equality, not just as formal-legal equality but as a fact of social reality.178  
Säcker and Friauf already presented this argument in the 1970s and early 
1980s.179  However, regardless of what one thinks of it, it does not answer 
the question of why the Court changed its view in 1992.  If one believes in 
the doctrinal explanation, why did it take the Court until 1992 to follow it? 
Why didn’t the Court apply it in 1987, when it decided Altersruhegeld and 
had already brought up the question only to leave it open?  If one does not 
believe in the doctrinal explanation, then why did the Court bring about the 
change in 1992?  What had happened between 1987 and 1992? 
A traditional judicial-politics argument for the Court’s change is that 
the change was overdue because the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and 
several EC Directives had been saying for a long time that the principle of 
gender equality authorized state measures to actively realize gender 
equality.180  West Germany had signed several public international law 
agreements that imposed obligations on signatory states to realize gender 
equality and adopt measures of affirmative action to make up for 
disadvantages suffered by women as a result of gender discrimination.181  
Several EU Directives, ECJ decisions, and the EU Treaty itself have required 
positive government measures to make gender equality a social reality.182  
Some authors argue that EU law decisively influenced the development of 
gender equality in West Germany.183  But again, even if one would follow 
this argument, the question remains: why did the Court not follow these leads 
prior to 1992? 
Other authors emphasize the BVerfG’s role as a moral and political 
leader in West Germany.  The Court, the argument goes, has been an engine 
of gender equality in West Germany and far ahead of a Zeitgeist that has 
been dominated by traditional perceptions of gen 
 
der roles.184 Christine Hohmann-Dennhardt, for example, speculates 
 
 178. See, for example, Friauf, supra notes 28, 29, and 156. 
 179. See supra, p. 35 et seq. 
 180. See Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, paras. 20 et seq.; Schweizer, supra note 150, 229 
et seq. 
 181. For details, see Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 19. 
 182. For details, see id. paras. 20 et seq. 
 183. Explicitly Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 23. 
 184. Christine Hohmann-Dennhardt, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und die Frauen, in: 
Robert Christian van Ooyen & Martin Möllers (eds.), Das Bundesverfassungsgericht im 
politischen System, 257 (2006). 
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about the reasons for the Court’s moral and political leadership and examines 
the extent to which female justices of the BVerfG may have guided the Court 
towards promoting gender equality.185  Even though Hohmann-Dennhardt 
concedes the difficulty of determining which justice has exercised what 
influence in specific decisions, she still tries to show how female justices of 
the BVerfG have contributed to the Court’s adjudication on gender 
equality.186 
None of these arguments sufficiently considers constitutional 
interpretation to explain the change. None of them even mentions the 1989 
Revolution and its possible implications for unified Germany’s 
constitutional law in general and the development of gender equality in 
particular.  This is even more surprising in the light of the fact that two 
historical events took place in Germany between 1987 (Altersruhegeld) and 
1992 (Nachtarbeit), the 1989 Revolution and the 1990 Unification. Pure 
coincidence?  I want to argue otherwise. 
 
3.   My Understanding: Nachtarbeit as an act of integration 
 
In 1992, the Court found itself in a peculiar situation.  In 1987, it could 
still afford to leave open the question of whether there was a constitutional 
government obligation to realize gender equality.  The question had been an 
issue since the mid-70s, but nothing of constitutional importance had 
materialized.  The Court had been practicing its traditional formal-legal 
approach to gender equality since the 1950s, most authors had agreed, and 
the changes that this approach had necessitated in the field of family law had 
been upsetting enough for many a staunch West German traditionalists.   
The dominant opinion on gender equality had always been very 
conservative in West Germany.  Heated discussions and a popular movement 
had been necessary to even get the principle of gender equality into the GG 
in 1949 in the first place.187  An early draft of the GG had not contained a 
provision for gender equality, and the first proposal by the Parliamentarian 
Council had limited gender equality to equal political rights and obligations. 
Massive pressure by feminist groups and others had been necessary to force 
the simple statement “men and women have equal rights” into the GG.188  
 
 185. See Hohmann-Dennhardt, id., 257 et seq. 
 186. Id. at 258 et seq. 
 187. See Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 5; Kokott, supra note 160, 1050. 
 188. Art. 3 II GG old version; for this and the following; see Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 
150, para. 5; Kokott, supra note 160, 1050. 
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The dominant opinion at the time had sharply distinguished between state 
and society and had argued that gender equality in the social sphere was none 
of the government’s business.  Whether women should pursue professional 
careers, or become housewives the argument went, was exclusively for the 
family to decide. Government, according to this view, was only authorized 
and obliged to deal with legal and political equality.  Wolfgang Abendroth 
writes that it took the BVerfG189 until 1959 to enforce the application of Art. 
3 II GG in the area of family law against a majority in the Bundestag and 
against the German Supreme Court (BGH).190  Met with so much resistance, 
the BVerfG had already taken a courageous step in 1987 by holding the 
legislature authorized to adopt laws that compensated women for 
discriminatory disadvantages.  To go even further and establish a 
government obligation to realize gender equality as a fact of social reality 
did not seem viable in 1987. 
The situation had changed fundamentally by 1992.  A successful 
revolution had taken place in East Germany in the fall of 1989.  One of the 
revolutionaries’ claims had been the establishment of real gender equality 
through active government intervention.  More generally, the principle of 
individual empowerment, i.e., a constitutional government obligation to 
actively develop a social environment in which constitutional individual 
rights can become a social reality for everyone instead of remaining only 
formal-legal rights, had been at the heart of the Revolution’s constitutional 
agenda.  The citizens’ movements had emphasized the importance of women 
for the Revolution’s success and had demanded the adoption of real equality 
for women as an explicit constitutional principle.191  The people in the streets 
had agreed and had expressed this agreement, for example, in a poll in which 
they held the GDR to be superior to West Germany when it comes to equal 
protection of women.192  The GDR Constitution of 1968/1974 had 
guaranteed equal treatment of the sexes in all areas of social, political, and 
personal life and had made the advancement of women a government 
obligation.193  Yet, when it came to social reality, women had been victims 
of discrimination in the GDR as well.  Even though there had been many 
women with professional careers, for example, women had been strongly 
underrepresented in important leadership positions in business, government, 
 
 189. BVerfGE 10, 59, decided on 29. July 1959. 
 190. See Wolfgang Abenroth, Das Grundgesetz, Eine Einführung in seine politischen 
Probleme, 66 (3rd ed. 1972). 
 191. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 586 et seq. 
 192. See Jaggi, supra note 1, 70. 
 193. See Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 150, para. 6.  
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and academics.194  Against this background, the revolutionaries had 
demanded real gender equality by including in the Social Charter the equal 
treatment of the sexes, comprehensive provision of day care, equal 
representation of men and women in all sectors of professional life, and a 
woman’s right to abortion.195  The draft of a new constitution for the GDR 
had established a government obligation to make gender equality a social 
reality by stating in Art. 3 (2) that the state is obliged to work towards equal 
treatment196 of women in the profession and in public life, in education and 
vocational training, in the family, and in social security.197  Finally, the first 
freely elected government in East Germany had emphasized the importance 
of realizing equal treatment of women in the professional world as well as in 
society in general.198  These had been clear statements demanding a 
constitutional government obligation to actively realize gender equality.   
This demand had been transferred to unified Germany by several 
means. Art. 5 UT had provided that unified Germany’s legislature shall deal 
with questions of amending the GG that had been raised by German 
unification.  Since the question of a constitutional government obligation to 
realize gender equality had been viewed differently in the post-revolutionary 
GDR on the one hand and in West Germany on the other, it had been an 
important question raised by unification.199  Art. 5 UT had thus transferred 
the topic as well as the East Germans’ opinion on it to unified Germany.  Art. 
31 (1) UT had specified the transfer by postulating that unified Germany’s 
legislature must further develop the law on gender equality.200  Finally, all 
new state constitutions contained an explicit government obligation to 
 
 194. See Pamela Heß, Geschlechterkonstruktionen nach der Wende, Auf dem Weg einer 
gemeinsamen Politischen Kultur?, 265 (2010) with further references; Schweizer, supra note 
150, 64. 
 195. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 595 et seq. 
 196. For the somewhat confusing and hairsplitting differentiation between equal rights 
(Gleichberechtigung) and equal treatment (Gleichstellung), see, for example, the GVK 
Report, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 561 et seq.; and Scholz, supra note 33, 
Art. 3 Abs. 2 GG paras. 59 et seq.  The term “equal rights” (Gleichberechtigung) seems to be 
preferred by defenders of the formal-legal approach to gender equality, whereas the defenders 
of the concept of real-social equality seem to prefer the term “equal treatment” 
(Gleichstellung).  The BVerfG does not ascribe different legal meaning to the terms, see 
BVerfGE 74, 163, juris-version, rec. 45, 46, 51. 
 197. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 596, 597. 
 198. See Government Declaration, supra note 54, p. 20; supra, 147. 
 199. Scholz writes that the question of gender equality did not stand in “immediate 
relationship” with unification; still he considers Art. 5 UT to be the basis for the new Art. 3 
II, 2 GG; see Scholz, supra note 33, Art. 3 Abs. 2 GG, para. 58. 
 200. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 618 et seq. 
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actively realize gender equality as a fact of social reality.201  
In this situation, it was no longer possible for the Court in 1992 to ignore 
the East Germans’ will. As opposed to 1987, when the Court had decided 
Altersruhegeld, in 1992 it was no longer only a minority opinion in the 
literature that argued for a constitutional government obligation to realize 
gender equality.  The revolutionary East Germans had spoken as pouvoir 
constituant, and they had demanded, among other things, an active 
realization of gender equality.  The West Germans had accepted this demand 
by signing the UT. What the BVerfG was confronted with in 1992 were no 
longer mere doctrinal or political arguments for a specific interpretation of 
Art. 3 II GG.  It was a forceful revolutionary statement by an important part 
of the German people, which had caused institutional reactions, had found 
legal manifestations, and had been transferred to unified Germany.202  When 
the Court decided Nachtarbeit on January 28, 1992, a change of 
constitutional dimensions had taken place, and unified Germany’s 
institutions needed to respond. 
The legislature, however, the institution primarily in charge of 
integrating revolutionary achievements into the GG,203 did not seem up to 
the task. Even though Art. 5 UT had provided a time frame of two years as 
of October 3, 1990, the GVK, which finally proposed the new Art. 3 II, 2 
GG in its Report in November 1993, had merely been founded on November 
28/29, 1991.204  The Bundestag had not taken up the Kuratorium’s Draft 
Constitution, according to which “[t]he government is obliged to bring about 
and secure the equal participation of the sexes in all areas of society” (Art. 3 
(2)), and “[m]easures promoting women in order to compensate them for 
existing disadvantages are no favoritism based on gender” (Art. 3 (4)).205 
Moreover, Art. 79 II GG required 2/3 majorities for amendments of the GG. 
And indeed, the legislature turned out to be unable to perform the integrative 
task.  The Bundesrat’s Commission’s proposal of May 14, 1992, for an 
amended Art. 3 II GG proves this impressively.  After more than a year of 
negotiations, the Commission’s proposal read “[w]omen and men have equal 
 
 201. See id. at 621 et seq.; see also the Constitutions of Brandenburg, Art. 12 III, 48 III, 2; 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Art. 13; Saxony, Art. 8; Saxony-Anhalt, Art. 34; Thuringia, 
Art. 2 II; and Berlin, Art. 10 III. 
 202. For the details of this process of revolutionary constitutional lawmaking, see Jaggi, 
supra note 6, 582 et seq. 
 203. See Art. 5 UT and Art. 31 UT in general and Art. 31 (1) UT in particular. 
 204. See supra, 7 et seq. 
 205. Schweizer, supra note 150, 54, 55 with further references. 
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rights” as opposed to the original “[m]en and women have equal rights.”206 
Some commentators called this proposal “ridiculous” in the light of 
persistent real discrimination against women in Germany.207  It took the 
GVK until October 1993 to agree on a proposal for the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG, 
and it took the legislature until September 23, 1994 to adopt it.208  The new 
Art. 3 II, 2 GG entered into force on November 15, 1994.209 Critics still call 
the amendment a “formula compromise,” which enables all sides to assert 
that it means what they want it to mean, leaving the meaning’s final 
determination to the Court.210  
At the same time, the actual need for government action fighting 
discrimination against women had become increasingly urgent, particularly 
in the new East German states.  While the female employment rate in the 
GDR prior to German unification had amounted to 91% in 1989 as opposed 
to only 55% in West Germany,211 the number of employed women in the 
new states had decreased significantly since the summer of 1990.212  By the 
end of 1992, 64.9% of 1.1 million unemployed in the new states were 
women.213 Within three years, from 1990 to 1993, only about half of the 
households that prior to unification had had both partners employed still had 
both partners employed.214  The partner still employed was usually male.215  
This development reestablished women’s traditional economic 
dependencies.216  Finally, women in the new East German states had been 
hit particularly hard by some of the legal changes in the wake of German 
unification.  For example, unified Germany’s legislature had repealed the 
additional consideration of times of child-raising for the acquisition of 
 
 206. See Bericht der Kommission Verfassungsreform des Bundesrates of May 14, 1992, 
in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 420 et seq. (444). 
 207. Representative Ulrike Mascher, in: Jutta Limbach & Marion Eckertz-Höfer (eds.), 
Frauenrechte im Grundgesetz des geeinigten Deutschland, 28 (1993). 
 208. See Beschluß des Bundesrates v. 23.09.1994, 834/94 (Beschluß), reprinted in: Fischer 
& Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 1002.  
 209. See Art. 2 of the GG-amending law (BGBl I 1994, 3146). 
 210. See Isensee, supra note 37, 2583, 2585.  Isensee calls the text a “dilatorischen 
Formelkompromiss”; see also Schweizer, supra note 150, 84; and Jutta Limbach, in: Limbach 
& Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 207, 299 et seq., 300. 
 211. Friedericke Maier, The labour market for women and employment perspectives in 
the aftermath of German unification, Cambridge Journal of Economics 1993, 268. 
 212. Id., at 273 et seq. 
 213. Id., at 274. 
 214. Schweizer, supra note 150, 63. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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pension claims, had reduced women’s rights to be excused from work to tend 
to sick children, and had reduced the availability of day care.217 
In this situation of legislative deadlock in combination with increasing 
dissatisfaction of East Germans with how revolutionary achievements were 
being treated in unified Germany, the Court’s obiter dictum in Nachtarbeit 
acquires a new meaning.  When the Court, for the first time in the GG’s 
history, stated that “the meaning of Art. 3 II GG that goes beyond the 
meaning of Art. 3 III GG is that it postulates “an order to equal protection 
and expands this order to apply also to social reality,”218 it engaged in an 
attempt to integrate the revolutionary achievement of a constitutional 
government obligation to realize gender equality into the existing 
constitutional order under the GG.  Even though the Court did not explicitly 
justify its new interpretation of Art. 3 II GG, it clearly shows signs of the 
integrative effort.  The Court takes the old Art. 3 II GG and gives it a new 
meaning that reflects what the revolutionary East Germans had fought for 
and had successfully transferred to unified Germany. 
The integrative pattern reoccurs in the Court’s later decisions on gender 
equality.  For example, in Kindererziehungszeiten219 the Court held 
constitutional the provisions of two laws dealing with the consideration of 
times of child-raising for purposes of acquiring rights in the statutory pension 
insurance.  The provisions examined by the Court allowed for the 
consideration of times of child-raising for purposes of acquiring rights in the 
statutory pension insurance only under certain restrictive conditions.220 
Under the traditional formal-legal approach to gender equality, these 
conditions would have been unproblematic because they applied equally to 
women and men.221  The fact that, in reality, women mostly devoted their 
time to child raising and were thus more strongly affected by the restrictive 
conditions (less insurance times meaning lower pensions) would have been 
irrelevant. 
After 1990, however, it was no longer possible to apply the formal-legal 
approach.  The revolutionary East Germans had clearly demanded a 
constitutional government obligation to make gender equality a social 
 
 217. Minister Marianne Birthler (Brandenburg), in Limbach & Eckertz-Höfer, supra note 
207, 36. 
 218. BVerfGE 85, 191, juris-version, rec. 53. 
 219. BVerfG, Urteil v. 07.07.1992, 1 BvL 51/86, 1 BvL 50/87, 1 BvR 873/90, 1 BvR 
761/91, BVerfGE 87, 1-48. 
 220. For the details, see BVerfGE 87, 1 juris-version, rec. 20. 
 221. See BVerfGE 87, 1, juris-version, rec. 5 et seq. referring to §§ 1227a RVO and 2a 
AVG, which applied to “mothers and fathers” equally. 
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reality.  Against this background, the Court had to confirm its statement in 
Nachtarbeit, this time, however, no longer in a mere obiter dictum but as part 
of the holding:222  “However, the insufficient consideration of periods of 
child-raising in the statutory pension insurance does in fact mainly 
disadvantage mothers because, to this very day, it is mostly they who take 
over child-raising and therefore limit, suspend, or give up their professional 
careers.”223  This fact, the Court concludes, “causes the legislature’s 
obligation based on Art. 3 II GG to work towards an equalization of the 
living conditions for men and women.”224  
Another example for the Court’s integrative efforts in the field of 
gender equality is its decision in Arbeitgeberzuschuss zum 
Mutterschaftsgeld225  The Court had to decide the constitutionality of a law 
that obliged employers to contribute to payments for women during six 
weeks before and eight weeks after childbirth.  During this time, the law 
prohibited a woman from working to protect her and her child against 
“dangers of the workplace, excessive demands, and health problems”.226 
Formally, the law was nondiscriminatory because the differentiation could 
be justified with the biological difference of pregnancy.  As a matter of social 
reality, however, the employers’ obligation to contribute to women’s 
payments during a time in which they were not allowed to work threatened 
to disadvantage women in the job market since employers, trying to avoid 
these contributions, were less likely to hire women.227  The Court itself 
pointed out that, in an earlier decision on the same topic in 1974, it had 
considered the law’s merely indirect impact on women’s job opportunities 
irrelevant in terms of gender discrimination.228  It had argued that employers 
were free to choose whether or not to hire women and thereby incur the legal 
 
 222. The Court held the provisions constitutional but made the decision’s reasons part of 
the holding (“nach Maßgabe der Gründe”). 
 223. BVerfGE 87, 1, juris-version, rec. 140 (my italics). 
 224. See BVerfGE 87, 1, juris-version rec. 140 (my italics), where the Court explicitly 
cites Nachtarbeit in support of this statement. The Court confirms the statement in 
Kindererziehungszeiten II, BVerfG Beschluss v. 12.03.1996, 1 BvR 609/90, 1 BvR 692/90, 
BVerfGE 94, 241-267, juris-version, rec. 52. 
 225. BVerfG Beschluss v. 18.11.2003, 1 BvR 302/96, BVerfGE 109, 64-96. 
 226. BVerfGE 109, 64, juris-version, rec. 1 et seq. 
 227. Id., rec. 217, 218, 222–226; the Court saw a violation of Art. 3 II GG in the fact that 
the obligation to contribute to an insurance (Ausgleichs- und Umlageverfahren) that would 
cover the expenses for women during the relevant time was limited to small enterprises. 
Larger enterprises did not have to participate in the insurance scheme, so that they were less 
likely to hire women, because their expenses for pregnant women and mothers, respectively, 
would not be covered by the insurance; see Id. 
 228. BVerfGE 109, 64, juris-version, rec. 191. 
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obligation to contribute to the payments.229  
In 2003, however, this argument was no longer feasible because, as the 
Court explicitly said, the law with respect to gender equality had changed.230 
The Court referred “in particular” to the new sentence 2 of Art. 3 II GG, 
added to the GG in 1994.231  What the Court referred to substantively, 
however, was the new constitutional government obligation to realize gender 
equality.  Yet, this new obligation had not been established in 1994 by the 
amendment of Art. 3 II GG but by the Court itself in 1992 in Nachtarbeit as 
a product of its integrative efforts.  It is this substantive change which the 
Court in Arbeitgeberzuschuss zum Mutterschaftsgeld makes the basis for a 
legislative obligation to come up with a regulation that, as a matter of social 
reality, equalizes women’s job opportunities.232 
In summary, my analysis offers a new perspective on why the Court 
developed a new approach to gender equality in 1992, at a time when the 
adoption of the new Art. 3 II, 2 GG was still more than two years away and 
very unsure.  Realizing that unified Germany’s legislature was getting 
nowhere in its attempt to integrate revolutionary achievements on gender 
equality into the existing constitutional order under the GG, the Court took 
over by interpreting Art. 3 II GG as establishing a government obligation to 
realize gender equality.  This understanding takes both constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional history more seriously. 
  
III. Abortion 
 
Abortion has been a highly controversial political and legal issue in 
Germany for a long time.233  The controversy has centered on the balancing 
of two competing constitutional rights: (i) the unborn child’s right to life234 
and (ii) the woman’s right to self-determination.  Based on this controversy, 
there were, prior to 1993, basically two models for the legal treatment of 
 
 229. BVerfGE 37, 121, juris-version, rec. 23; BVerfGE 109, 64, juris-version, rec. 191. 
 230. BVerfGE 109, 64, juris-version, rec. 191. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id., rec. 192, 225, 231, 232. 
 233. For an overview, see, for example, Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra note 28, 154 
et seq.; Donald Kommers, Liberty and Community in Constitutional Law: The Abortion Cases 
in Comparative Perspective, BYU L. REV. 371, 391 et seq. (1985); KOMMERS, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 335 et seq. (2nd 
ed. 1997). 
 234. For an explanation of this concept, see Kommers, BYU L. REV. 371, 393 et seq. 
(1985). 
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abortions in Germany: (i) the so-called indication model, which emphasizes 
the unborn child’s right to life and (ii) the so-called time-phase model, which 
emphasizes the woman’s right to self-determination, at least during the first 
twelve weeks of the pregnancy. 
The indication model makes abortion a crime and only provides for 
exceptions if specific indications are ascertained. The indications are: (i) the 
mother’s life or health is in danger (the so-called medical indication); (ii) the 
pregnancy is the result of a crime, such as rape or incest (the so-called ethical 
indication); (iii) the unborn child is diagnosed with birth defects (the so-
called eugenic indication); and (iv) the pregnant woman suffers from social 
and psychological conflicts that are as damaging to her as any of the other 
indications (the so-called social indication).  The time-phase model, on the 
other hand, grants the pregnant woman a right to abortion during the first 
twelve weeks of the pregnancy under the condition that, prior to the abortion, 
she participates in so-called “preventive counseling”.235   
In 1975, in Abortion I,236 the BVerfG repudiated a legislative attempt 
to introduce a time-phase model in West Germany.  The Court declared the 
law unconstitutional and argued that it did not provide for an effective 
protection of the unborn child.  Based on the GG, the Court argued, criminal 
punishment of abortion throughout the entire pregnancy was necessary to 
effectively protect the unborn child.237  In 1993, in Abortion II,238 the Court 
 
 235. That the woman has a right to an abortion during the first twelve weeks of the 
pregnancy is the time-phase model’s characteristic criterion.  This is its main difference 
compared to the Court’s counseling model, under which the woman, during the first twelve 
weeks of a pregnancy, does not have a right to an abortion but is only free from criminal 
punishment if she has an abortion.  Preventive abortion counseling“ means that the woman is 
„instructed about the public and private assistance available for pregnant women, for mothers, 
and children, especially such assistance that facilitates the continuation of the pregnancy and 
eases the conditions of mother and child“. In addition, the woman must be counseled on the 
medical aspects of an abortion by a physician; see § 218c (1) of the Abortion Reform Act of 
June 18, 1974 (5. Strafrechtsreformgesetz v. 18.06.1974, BGBl I 1974, 1297 – 1300). 
 236. BVerfG, Urteil v. 25.02.1975, 1 BvF 1-6/74, NJW 1975, 573 et seq. 
 237. See BVerfG, NJW 1975, 579: “Durch die völlige Aufhebung der Strafbarkeit ist 
jedoch eine Schutzlücke entstanden, welche die Sicherung des sich entwickelnden Lebens in 
einer nicht geringen Anzahl von Fällen gänzlich beseitigt” and 581: “Jedoch vermögen weder 
die gegenwärtig angebotenen und gewährten Hilfen dieser Art noch die im 5. StrRG 
[Strafrechtsreformgesetz] vorgesehene Beratung den individuellen Lebensschutz zu ersetzen, 
den eine Strafnorm grundsätzlich auch heute noch in den Fällen gewährt, in denen für den 
Abbruch einer Schwangerschaft kein nach der Wertordnung des Grundgesetzes achtenswerter 
Grund besteht” and “Er [der Gesetzgeber] muß vielmehr den ernsthaften Versuch 
unternehmen, durch eine Differenzierung der Strafandrohung einen wirksameren 
Lebensschutz . . . zu erreichen.” 
 238. BVerfG, Urteil v. 28.05.1993, 2 BvF 2/90, 2 BvF 4/92, 2 BvF 5/92, NJW 1993, 1751 et seq. 
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changed its mind.  After unified Germany’s legislature, in an attempt to 
fulfill its obligation under Art. 31 (4) UT, had adopted another time-phase 
model in an act dating from July 27, 1992,239 the Court declared that during 
the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy criminal punishment of abortion was 
no longer required by the GG to effectively protect the unborn child.  Instead, 
the Court now considered a specified model of counseling sufficient.240 
Again, the question is how to explain this change?  As in the previous 
cases, there are authors who simply deny any change.  Other authors provide 
the typical doctrinal explanations of judicial restraint and deference to the 
legislature.  Again, others think of the change as a product of judicial politics 
trying to find a compromise between the different East and West German 
abortion models.  Finally, there are authors who think the Court’s opinion is 
simply paradoxical and wrong.   
Again, I want to offer a new explanation.  Putting Abortion II into 
historical perspective, I will show that it should be understood as the Court’s 
attempt to integrate the revolutionary achievement of individual 
empowerment with the traditional West German emphasis on the protection 
of the unborn child, the social function of criminal law, and women’s 
traditional role in society. 
In what follows, I will first outline the similarities and fundamental 
differences between the Court’s constitutional treatment of abortion in 1975 
on the one hand and 1993 on the other. I will then summarize the traditional 
understanding of Abortion II and show why it is not convincing.  Finally, I 
will present my own understanding of Abortion II as the Court’s attempt to 
integrate revolutionary achievements into the existing constitutional order 
under the GG. 
 
The Decision: Abortion II (1993) 
 
In Abortion II the Court decided on the constitutionality of a new law 
on abortion adopted in July 1992.241  The new law was the legislature’s 
response to Art. 31 (4) UT, which had made it “the task of unified Germany’s 
legislature, by December 31, 1992, the latest, to adopt a law that better 
 
 239. Art. 13 Schwangeren- und Familienhilfegesetz of 27.07.1992 (BGBl I 1992, 1398) 
amended §§ 218 et seq. StGB. 
 240. See BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1756 et seq. 
 241. The law’s official name is Gesetz zum Schutz des vorgeburtlichen/werdenden 
Lebens, zur Förderung einer kinderfreundlicheren Gesellschaft, für Hilfen im 
Schwangerschaftskonflikt und zur Regelung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs (Schwangeren- 
und Familienhilfegesetz) v. 27.07.1992 (BGBl I 1992, 1398). 
1 - FINAL - Jaggi - Revolutionary Reform in German .docx 6/5/2018  11:41 AM 
214 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:3 
provides for the protection of the unborn life and for the support of pregnant 
women . . .”.242  The law introduced a time-phase model, i.e. it declared 
abortions undertaken during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy “not 
illegal” if the woman had participated in specified counseling prior to the 
abortion.  The Court held § 218a Abs. 1 StGB of the new law 
unconstitutional arguing that the GG does not permit to declare “not illegal” 
abortions undertaken during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy under 
the stated requirements.  The Court, moreover, held that the specific 
regulation of the counseling violated the GG.243  Finally, the Court issued an 
enforcement order entering its own counseling model into force for as long 
as the legislature would need to come up with a new law that complied with 
the holding.244  The enforcement order prevented the continued application 
of the GDR’s time phase model in the new East German states based on Art. 
31 (4) last sentence UT.245  
Analytically, Abortion II can be divided into two parts: part 1 
confirming principles established in Abortion I and part 2 developing a new 
approach. 
In part 1 the Court confirms the following basic positions of Abortion 
I: A fetus is an “unborn human life” that possesses human dignity and has an 
own right to life.  This right must be protected by the government against 
dangers emanating from other individuals, including the mother.246  
Effective protection of the fetus requires the legislature to establish, as a 
matter of principle, the mother’s legal obligation to carry the child to term.247  
This legal obligation may only be suspended under exceptional 
circumstances when compliance with the obligation is “intolerable.”  These 
are circumstances in which the aforementioned medical, ethical, eugenic, or 
social indications have been ascertained.248  Criminal law is the ultima ratio 
to prevent conduct that is so harmful that its prevention is particularly urgent. 
Therefore, the criminalization of abortion, regularly, is the right means to 
establish a woman’s legal obligation to carry the child to term.249  However, 
 
 242. See infra, 67. 
 243. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1752. 
 244. Id., 1752, 1773, 1774. 
 245. See infra, 67, 68; see also Rüdiger Breuer, Der verfassungsrechtliche Schutz des 
Lebens - Integrationsprobleme im Widervereinigten Deutschland, in: Jörn Ipsen (ed.), 
Verfassungsrecht im Wandel, 25, 39 (1995). 
 246. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1753. 
 247. Id., 1753, 1754. 
 248. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1754. 
 249. Id., 1754, 1755. 
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the criminalization of abortion is not required if and to the extent to which 
other, less invasive, means can provide constitutionally sufficient protection 
of the unborn life.  If that is the case, it may suffice to express a woman’s 
general obligation to carry the child to term by legal means other than 
criminal law.250 
In part 2 the Court develops rules for how the state may discharge its 
constitutional obligation to protect the u nborn child. These rules manifest a 
fundamental shift in the Court’s constitutional concept of unborn-child 
protection compared to its 1975 abortion decision. Conceptionally, there is a 
shift from repression of abortion through criminal law to prevention of 
abortion through combining a timely limited freedom to have an abortion 
with abortion counseling.  Moreover, there is a shift from a concept of 
imposition that tried to force the woman to carry the child to term to a concept 
of empowerment that tries to motivate the woman to carry the child to term 
by offering support.  In what follows I will summarize these concepts’ 
characteristics and fundamental differences. 
From repression to prevention.  In Abortion I the Court held that even 
though criminal punishment was the legislature’s sharpest sword and must 
only be applied as ultima ratio, its application was constitutionally required 
to prevent abortions.  In the Court’s view, it was uncertain whether other, 
less invasive means, such as the time-phase model, would be at least equally 
effective in protecting the unborn child.251  Even though the criminal law’s 
effectiveness in protecting the unborn child was equally unproven and it was 
“generally acknowledged” that criminal law as applied until 1975 had lacked 
effectiveness,252 the Court nevertheless insisted on the criminalization of 
abortion. It argued that the existing empirical information did not allow for 
a definite conclusion regarding the time-phase model’s effectiveness in 
reducing the number of abortions.253  In this situation, the Court argued, the 
importance of the child’s right to life required the strongest measure of 
protection and did not allow for experiments.254  The legislature, already in 
1975, had argued that a time-phase model in combination with preventive 
 
 250. Id., 1755. 
 251. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 577, 578, 580, 584. 
 252. Id., 578; the original reads: “Es ist allgemein anerkannt, dass der bisherige § 218 
StGB, gerade weil er für nahezu alle Fälle des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs undifferenzierte 
Strafe androhte, das sich entwickelnde Leben im Ergebnis nur unzureichend geschützt hat”; 
see id., D. II. on p. 578. 
 253. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 580. 
 254. Id.; the original reads: “Experimente sind aber bei dem hohen Wert des zu 
schützenden Rechtsgutes nicht zulässig.” 
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counseling would be more effective in protecting the unborn child.  The 
threat of criminal punishment, the argument went, drives women into 
illegality and thus keeps them from participating in preventive counseling 
that would protect the unborn child.255  Already in 1975, the dissenting 
justices Wiltraut Rupp-v. Brünneck and Helmut Simon argued that the time-
phase model was constitutional unless it was proven to be ineffective in 
protecting the unborn child.  They argued it would violate the principle of 
proportionality to insist on criminal punishment of abortion unless it was 
proven that criminal punishment, i.e. the ultima ratio, was able and necessary 
to protect the unborn child.256  However, the Court’s majority in 1975 
decided to “reverse the burden of proof”257 and required the legislature to 
prove that its time-phase model was “at least” as effective as, or even more 
effective than, criminal punishment in protecting the unborn child.258  Since 
the legislature was unable to prove that, the time-phase model was held 
unconstitutional.259  The Court thus insisted on criminal law as a means to 
repress abortions. 
This approach changed fundamentally in Abortion II. In Abortion II, 
the Court declared a model constitutional that renounced the criminalization 
of abortions undertaken during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy after 
specific preventive counseling (the Court calls it the “counseling model”).260  
The Court argued that it “appeared defensible” that the counseling model 
provided effective protection of the unborn child,261 even though the model’s 
actual effectiveness remained unproven (as it had been in 1975).  The Court, 
thus, just dropped the Abortion I requirement according to which the 
legislature had to prove the counseling model’s effectiveness.  It was 
undisputed that the indication model as it had been applied so far had not 
been effective.262  However, that was the case in 1975, too.263  Still, in 1975 
 
 255. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 578. 
 256. Id., at 584. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id., at 578, 580, 581. 
 260. See for example, BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1757 et seq. 
 261. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1756, 1757; on p. 1756 the Court argues that it examines whether 
the legislature’s prognosis that its concept of protection is sufficiently effective is “defensible” 
(“vertretbar”); on p. 1757 the Court states that the legislature’s “appraisal” according to which 
the state has a better chance to protect the unborn child if it cooperates with the mother 
“appears justified” (“lassen die Einschätzung berechtigt erscheinen”). 
 262. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1757. 
 263. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 578: “It is generally acknowledged that the previous § 218 StGB 
. . . has in the end only insufficiently protected the developing life.” 
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the Court stated that “[i]t is constitutionally unobjectionable and must be 
accepted if the legislature tries to comply with its obligation to provide a 
better protection of unborn life through preventive measures, including a 
counseling that strengthens the woman’s own responsibility.”264  That 
sounded fundamentally different in 1993:  
 
It is, however, controversial, scientifically as well as 
politically, whether a counseling model for abortions in the early 
phase of the pregnancy provides a better protection for the 
unborn life than the previous regulation [i.e., the previous 
indication model]. . . .  In the face of the demonstrated reasons 
that speak against the continuation of the previous indication 
model, however, such uncertainties do not prevent the 
legislature, as a matter of principle, from introducing a 
counseling model.265   
 
Had the Court stuck to its 1975 principles, it would have had to 
conclude that, because of the remaining uncertainties regarding the 
counseling model’s effectiveness, criminal punishment was still 
constitutionally required.266 But the Court did not, in 1993, the Court was 
content with the fact that the legislature’s assessment of the counseling 
model’s effectiveness was “defensible.”267 The Court, thus, allowed for a 
conceptual shift from the criminal repression of abortions to the prevention 
of abortions through counseling. 
From imposition to empowerment. Another profound difference 
between Abortion I and Abortion II lies in the Court’s psychological and 
sociological concepts to protect the unborn child. Abortion I stands for an 
authoritarian imposition of a traditional mother role upon women by 
threatening them with criminal punishment in case of non-compliance. 
Abortion II, while holding on to a legal obligation to carry the child to term, 
emphasizes a concept of empowering the woman to decide in favor of the 
child. It does so by respecting the woman’s decision to have an abortion 
 
 264. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 578 (my italics). 
 265. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1757 (my italics). 
 266. In 1975 the Court held that the legislature may only refrain from criminal punishment 
of abortion if another legal sanction would be at its disposal that would prevent abortions as 
effectively as criminal punishment; see BVerfG, NJW 1975, 577, 578. 
 267. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1756; the original reads: “. . . die verfassungsrechtliche Prüfung 
erstreckt sich . . . darauf, ob der Gesetzgeber . . . seinen Einschätzungsspielraum ‘in 
vertretbarer Weise‘ gehandhabt hat.” 
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during the first twelve weeks of her pregnancy after counseling and at the 
same time supporting her, through public welfare and counseling, in 
deciding in favor of the child.268   
In both decisions, the Court stated a theoretical priority of 
empowerment over imposition, i.e. of social support over criminal 
punishment.269  However, the Court’s elaborations on active governmental 
support in Abortion I were cursory, at best.  After stating that the government 
must “primarily” apply “social-political and welfare means” to protect the 
child,270 the Court revealed that the goal of such means was not to empower 
the woman to make a decision in favor of the child but to force upon her the 
conviction that it is her duty to carry the child to term: “the main goal will 
be to strengthen the future mother’s willingness to . . . accept her pregnancy 
and to carry the child to term.”271  “to reawaken the mother’s willingness to 
protect the child . . . and if necessary to strengthen it should be the premier 
goal of the state’s efforts to protect life.”272  The Court considered social 
support as slow and ineffective in shaping a woman’s attitude while it 
emphasized the effectiveness of criminal law in shaping social perceptions 
and protecting the unborn life.273  While the Court cursorily addressed the 
need to inform about how to prevent unwanted pregnancies and how to 
access effective social support,274 it emphasized what it apparently 
considered to be the real problem: “there are many women . . . who do not 
suffer from economic plight or a serious conflict.  They reject their 
pregnancy because they are not willing to endure the encompassing hardship 
and to accept the natural motherly duties.”275 The most effective means to 
correct such attitudes was, according to the Court, the threat of criminal 
punishment because “. . . already the pure existence of such a threat . . . has 
 
 268. Breuer writes that the state must act “cooperatively and persuasively” with respect to 
the participants in the conflict; see Breuer, supra note 245, 48. 
 269. See BVerfG, NJW 1975, 576. 
 270. Id.; the original reads: “Es ist daher Aufgabe des Staates, in erster Linie 
sozialpolitische und fürsorgerische Mittel zur Sicherung des werdenden Lebens einzusetzen.” 
 271. Id.; the original reads: “Dabei wird es hauptsächlich darauf ankommen, die 
Bereitschaft der werdenden Mutter zu stärken, die Schwangerschaft . . . anzunehmen und die 
Leibesfrucht zum vollen Leben zu bringen.” 
 272. Id.; the original reads: “Den mütterlichen Schutzwillen . . . wieder zu wecken und 
erforderlichenfalls zu stärken sollte das vornehmste Ziel der staatlichen Bemühungen um 
Lebensschutz sein.” 
 273. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 576 et seq., 579. 
 274. Id., 581. 
 275. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 579 (my italics). 
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an effect on the peoples’ perception of values and on their conduct.”276  
These arguments reflect the Court’s perception of a government that imposes 
a traditional role upon pregnant women and tries to enforce this role by 
threatening with criminal punishment in case of non-compliance. 
The Court’s perception changed fundamentally in Abortion II. To be 
sure, the Court held on to the pregnant woman’s legal obligation to carry the 
child to term.  However, to achieve compliance with this obligation, the 
Court allowed the legislature to refrain from threats of criminal punishment 
during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy and to respect the woman’s 
decision to have an abortion during that time.  The Court further wanted to 
empower the woman to make a responsible decision in favor of the child by 
obliging the government to actively generate a social environment that 
encourages a woman to carry her child to term.  The Court emphasizes that 
the government must protect the unborn child not only against dangers 
emanating from other people but must also “stand up to such dangers . . . that 
are rooted in the actual and foreseeable real circumstances of the life of the 
woman and her family . . . .”277  Where Abortion I laconically referred to the 
insight that it was the government’s foremost obligation to prevent abortions 
by way of information and effective social support,278 Abortion II elaborates 
in great detail on an active government obligation to make sure that abortions 
are not undertaken because of an “economic emergency.”279  For example, 
the Court argues that the government must prevent disadvantages that 
women may suffer as a result of the pregnancy with respect to vocational 
training and professional development.280  The government must examine 
factors that may burden pregnant women or mothers and must make an effort 
to repeal or alleviate difficulties. The government must actively promote a 
child-friendly society through, among other things, appropriate regulation of 
employment, landlord-tenant relationships, and pensions.281  With respect to 
the latter, the Court explicitly refers to Kindererziehungszeiten.282  Finally, 
the Court gives detailed instructions to the legislature on how to regulate 
abortion counseling.283  These elements reflect a concept of empowering 
women to decide in favor of the child. 
 
 276. Id. 
 277. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1755 (my italics). 
 278. BVerfG, NJW 1975, 581. 
 279. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1755. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id., 1760 et seq. 
1 - FINAL - Jaggi - Revolutionary Reform in German .docx 6/5/2018  11:41 AM 
220 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:3 
 
Traditional Understanding 
 
Authors differ as to what the Court said in Abortion II and how that is 
different from what it had said in Abortion I.  Alec Stone Sweet’s, for 
example, simply denies a change in the Court’s constitutional abortion 
requirements from 1975 to 1993.  According to Stone Sweet, the BVerfG in 
1993 essentially upheld its 1975 ruling.284 Other, more differentiated, 
opinions emphasize either doctrinal or judicial policy aspects. 
Some authors approve of Abortion II as a return to judicial restraint. 
They argue that, where the Court in 1975 had acted like a legislator by 
insisting on a criminalizing of abortion, in 1993 it deferred to the 
legislature’s basic decision to forego criminal punishment during the first 
twelve weeks of the pregnancy after counseling.285  Others criticize Abortion 
II for a lack of judicial restraint, arguing that the Court’s detailed 
prescriptions, in particular with respect to counseling, are a “usurpation” of 
the legislative function.286 
Still others consider Abortion II an act of judicial politics. Quint, for 
example, views the Court’s counseling model as a political compromise 
between West Germany’s indication model and the GDR’s time-phase 
model.287  Some authors imply that the Court surrendered to the Zeitgeist,288 
while others complain that the Court did not sufficiently consider GDR 
positions in the compromise.289   
 
 284. Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges, Constitutional Politics in Europe, 112 
(2000). 
 285. For the argument, see Justices Rupp-v. Brünneck and Simon dissenting in Abortion 
I, NJW 1975, 582, 583. 
 286. See Hans-Peter Schneider, Die Vollstreckungskompetenz nach § 35 BVerfGG - Ein 
Notverordnungsrecht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 
1994, 2591. 
 287. Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra note 28, 159 et seq., 163 et seq.; Quint concludes 
that “the underlying result of the parliamentary legislation – as modified by the Court’s 
decision – is actually closer to what might have been expected in a new constitution, adopting 
certain ideas from east and west under article 146. . . .  In the end . . . the east kept a remnant 
of its own position on this matter – a view derived from the old regime but also endorsed in 
the Round Table’s draft constitution”; see id., 164, 165; similarly Breuer, supra note 245, 47. 
 288. See Willi Geiger, Menetekel - An die Adresse des Bundestags, der Bundesregierung 
und des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Schriftenreihe der Juristenvereinigung Lebensrecht e.V. 
zu Köln, Nr. 10, 33 et seq. (1993); and Hans Faller, Beratung und Hilfe statt Strafe, Die Urteile 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Schwangerschaftsabbruch von 1975 und 1993, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) v. 08.06.1993, 12.  
 289. Anita Gradke, Anmerkungen zum Urteil des BVerfG zu § 218 StGB, Neue Justiz 
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Finally, there are authors who are simply confused by the Court’s 
decision and call it contradictory and paradoxical.290 This criticism is 
reflected in the statement that “the majority opinion, at the end of the day, 
prohibits an act and declares it illegal but at the same time allows it and 
regulates it legally.”291 
None of these explanations are satisfactory. Stone Sweet’s approach 
can be rejected offhand because it simply ignores the described fundamental 
changes from Abortion I to Abortion II.  Whatever one thinks of the 
decisions’ details, it seems impossible to deny the following change.  Prior 
to Abortion II, the Court had insisted on criminal punishment of abortion 
throughout the pregnancy as part of the indication model.  As of Abortion II 
the Court has accepted a so-called counseling model according to which 
women can have an abortion during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy 
after preventive counseling without being threatened with criminal 
punishment.292  If that is no fundamental change, I don’t know what is. 
The arguments for or against judicial deference are inconclusive 
because they focus on individual aspects of Abortion II and ignore the bigger 
 
(NJ) 1993, 347, 348 criticizes that “the exclusive basis for the Court’s deductions is the old 
states’ indication model” and that the Court doesn’t take the GDR’s model, described as 
“time-phase model with support concept” (“Fristenlösung mit Hilfskonzept”), into 
consideration.  Moreover, in Gradke’s view, the Court does not consider that under the GDR 
law the number of abortions had decreased since the 1980s and that the birth rates in the GDR 
have always been higher than in West Germany; see Gradke, id., 348.  Gradke argues that the 
Court’s new concept is a limitation of liberty and self-determination for women in the former 
GDR, who had been hoping for more freedom as a result of unification, see id. 
 290. Monika Frommel, § 218 StGB: Straflos aber rechtswidrig; zielorientiert aber 
ergebnisoffen - Paradoxien der Übergangsregelung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Kritische 
Justiz (KJ) 1993, 327, 329.  
 291. Gradke, supra note 289, 347.  
 292. Except for Stone Sweet, most authors seem to recognize this fundamental difference 
between Abortion I and Abortion II, see, for example, Christian Starck, Der 
verfassungsrechtliche Schutz des ungeborenen menschlichen Lebens, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 
1993, 818, who writes that the Court’s holding in 1993 reflects the general acceptance of the 
time-phase model as the new model of protecting the unborn child; or Frommel, supra note 
290, 330, who writes, “In terms of criminal law, there is a time-phase model in the form of 
the so-called counseling model in force since July 16, 1993”; Breuer, supra note 245, 45 et 
seq. calls Abortion II a “paradigm change” (“Paradigmenwechsel”) and a “changed 
adjudication” (“gewandelte Rechtsprechung”); see also the Court itself, who writes in 
BVerfGE 98, 265, 302 about a change “. . . from criminal law as a governmental reaction to 
abortions to a concept of protection through counseling safeguarded by criminal law” (“. . . 
vom Strafrecht als staatlicher Reaktion auf Schwangerschaftsabbrüche zu einem strafrechtlich 
abgesicherten Konzept des Schutzes durch Beratung”); Quint, The Imperfect Union, supra 
note 28, 160 writes: “. . . in a very significant theoretical shift, the Court for the first time 
moved away from a general requirement for the criminal penalization of abortion” (my 
italics). 
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picture.  As a matter of fact, the Court partly deferred to the legislature and 
partly did not. It deferred to the legislature’s general decision to replace 
criminal punishment with social support and counseling during the first 
twelve weeks of the pregnancy.  It did not defer to the legislature’s specific 
implementation of this new model and, at great length and detail, developed 
its own counseling model, which applied until the legislature came up with 
a model that fulfilled the Court’s demands. 
Finally, characterizing Abortion II as an act of judicial politics that, 
more or less successfully, compromises between West German and East 
German abortion models gives up too easily on the possibility of explaining 
the changes in terms of constitutional interpretation. 
 
My Understanding: Abortion II as an act of integration 
 
My thesis is that Abortion II, just like the other decisions that I have 
analyzed so far, is better, i.e., more realistically and meaningfully, 
understood as an act of constitutional interpretation in the sense of 
integrating revolutionary achievements.  The Court, confronted with a 
legislature that had failed to properly integrate into the existing constitutional 
order under the GG the 1989 Revolution’s achievements regarding abortion, 
took over the integrative task and developed its own counseling model as a 
means of integration.  
Abortion I (1975) clearly stands for West Germany’s constitutional 
approach to abortion. Its characteristics were repression and imposition.293  
It emphasized the constitutional protection of the unborn child and tried to 
achieve it by requiring the repression of abortions through criminal law.  
Where it included governmental support for women as a means to protect the 
unborn child, this means was of subordinate and limited importance, as can 
be seen in the brevity with which the Court mentioned it.294  The approach 
saw the government as authoritatively imposing a traditional role upon 
pregnant women and enforcing this role through criminal law.295 
One of the 1989 Revolution’s constitutional achievements is the 
principle of individual empowerment, which comprises of (i) a constitutional 
government obligation to establish a social environment in which 
constitutional rights can become a social reality for everyone; (ii) the 
promotion of real-social (as opposed to only formal-legal) equality for 
 
 293. See supra, 57 et seq., 60 et seq. 
 294. See BVerfG, NJW 1975, 576; supra, 283. 
 295. See supra, 61. 
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women; and (iii) a woman’s right to abortion.296  With respect to abortion, 
the principle of individual empowerment aims at preventing abortions by 
empowering women through governmental support, counseling, and the 
liberty, during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy, to make a free and 
responsible decision for or against the unborn child.  During this early period 
of the pregnancy, individual empowerment’s clear emphasis is on the 
woman’s right to self-determination, not on the protection of the unborn 
child. A woman’s right to abortion was an important demand by the people 
in the streets, expressed in chants, such as “Hätte Frau Marx abgetrieben, 
wär uns viel erspart geblieben”.297  This demand found its legal manifestation 
in both the Social Charter and the RTD.  The Social Charter granted women 
a right to abortion.298 Art. 4 (3) of the revolutionaries’ draft constitution gave 
women the right to a self-determined pregnancy and obliged the government 
to protect the unborn child by providing social support.299  East Germany’s 
first freely elected government emphasized the necessity of economic and 
moral support, particularly for women, in order to protect the unborn child.300 
Moreover, in direct response to the people in the streets, the government 
decided to preserve the GDR’s time-phase model instead of taking over West 
Germany’s indication model.301  The UT transferred these achievements to 
unified Germany. Art. 31 (4) UT obliged unified Germany’s legislature to 
improve the legal protection of the unborn child particularly through legally 
guaranteed claims for women, particularly to counseling and social help.302  
It underlined the importance of the task by stating that the GDR’s abortion 
law would remain in force in the new states until unified Germany’s 
legislature would come up with an improved concept.  
Abortion II must be understood as integrating several principles: (i) 
West Germany’s emphasis on the protection of the unborn child with the 
revolutionaries’ emphasis on the woman’s right to self-determination; (ii) 
West Germany’s concept of repressing abortions through criminal law with 
the revolutionaries’ concept of preventing abortions through governmental 
support and counseling; and (iii) West Germany’s authoritative imposition 
 
 296. See supra, 3, 4. 
 297. “If Mrs. Marx had had an abortion we would have been spared a lot,” quoted in: 
Tetzner, supra note 50, 132. 
 298. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 595 et seq. 
 299. Id., 597. 
 300. See Government Declaration, supra note 54, p. 19. 
 301. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 609.  For a brief summary of the GDR’s time-phase model, 
see Breuer, supra note 245, 34. 
 302. My italics.  
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of a traditional role upon women with the revolutionaries’ principle of 
individual empowerment through active governmental support. 
(i) Abortion II holds on to the pregnant woman’s legal obligation to 
carry the child to term, so that abortions remain illegal throughout the entire 
pregnancy. Hence, the Court had to hold unconstitutional the legislature’s 
attempt to declare abortions undertaken within the first twelve weeks of the 
pregnancy “not illegal.”  I consider this the result of the Court’s attempt to 
integrate the revolutionaries’ emphasis on the woman’s right to self-
determination with the West German emphasis on the unborn child’s right 
to life. Trying to harmonize these two conflicting constitutional positions, 
the Court argues that the unborn child’s right to life prevents the typical 
balancing in which each legal position gives way a little.303  It is impossible 
to gradually reduce or temporarily suspend the right to life because a 
reduction or suspension of that right necessarily means the individual life’s 
complete destruction.304  This is why the Court holds it “impossible to find a 
balance that protects the unborn life and at the same time grants the pregnant 
woman a right to abortion, because abortion is always killing the unborn 
life.”305  Against this background the Court holds it impossible to let the 
woman’s right to self-determination prevail over the unborn’s right to life 
even for a limited period of time.306  The Court is thus only willing to grant 
a right to abortion in cases in which carrying the child to term is 
intolerable.307  These are the cases in which the aforementioned indications 
have been ascertained.308  Whatever one thinks of these arguments,309 they 
clearly show the Court’s self-conscious effort to harmonize West Germany’s 
emphasis on the protection of the unborn life with the revolutionaries’ 
emphasis on the protection of the woman’s right to self-determination. That 
the revolutionary principle had to step back because the Court found it 
impossible to compromise the unborn’s right to life is no evidence to the 
contrary. It must rather be explained with the fact that the right to life is 
protected, inter alia, by Art. 1 I, 1 GG (human dignity), the GG’s most 
 
 303. In German constitutional law this is known as the establishment of “practical 
concordance” (“praktische Konkordanz“); see Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des 
Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, paras. 317 et seq. (20 ed. 1999). 
 304. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1754. 
 305. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1754 (my italics). 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. For a critique, see, for example, the dissenters Justices Mahrenholz and Sommer in: 
BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1774 et seq. 
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important principle. 
(ii) While the unborn child’s right to life cannot be subjected to 
proportional balancing with the woman’s right to self-determination, the 
Court has always recognized a higher degree of flexibility when it comes to 
devising the means with which to protect the right to life. Based on West 
Germany’s concept of repressing abortions through criminal law, the Court 
in 1975 insisted on criminal law as the only effective means of protecting the 
unborn life (indication model).  The 1989 Revolution has favored a different 
concept. Based on the principle of individual empowerment, it has promoted 
a woman’s right to abortion during the first twelve weeks of her pregnancy 
in combination with social support and counseling to enable the woman to 
make a responsible decision (time-phase model). In Abortion II the Court 
takes up both concepts and tries to integrate them by replacing, during the 
first twelve weeks of the pregnancy, the concept of criminal punishment with 
the concept of counseling, however, without granting a right to abortion, 
except in cases in which an indication is present.  The Court itself explains 
this new “counseling model” as a product of integration by self-consciously 
putting it into historical perspective and explicitly referring to both the UT 
and the will of the revolutionary East Germans in order to justify it:  
[A] new regulation of the questions related to abortion has 
been prompted by Art. 31 IV UT;310 unified Germany’s 
legislature may argue in favor of the counseling model that it may 
appear to be better suited to bring together the eastern and 
western legal orders that had so far been characterized by a 
time-phase model on the one hand and an indication model on 
the other, as well as the different legal perceptions of the people 
that have been shaped in different ways by these two different 
concepts.311 
This language demonstrates that, instead of only engaging in judicial 
politics, the Court tries to integrate two different legal concepts from two 
different eras of German constitutional history.  
(iii) Finally, the Court’s shift from a concept of authoritative imposition 
upon women of a traditional role by threatening with criminal punishment to 
a concept of empowering women to make a responsible decision, preferably 
in favor of carrying the child to term, is also best understood as a product of 
interpretive integration.  In 1975, the Court had insisted on criminalizing 
abortions as the most effective means to shape people’s attitudes and 
 
 310. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1756. 
 311. Id. (my italics). 
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convince women to accept their “natural motherly duties.”312  In 1993, after 
the revolutionary East Germans had successfully fought for the principle of 
individual empowerment and this principle had been transferred to unified 
Germany, imposition by criminalization was no longer feasible.  To be sure, 
the unborn child’s right to life still required protection and could not be 
compromised. However, in the light of the revolutionary principle of 
individual empowerment, women’s social reality, including their 
psychological and economic reality, needed to be taken into account more 
strongly. 
This is reflected, for instance, in the Court’s arguments supporting the 
counseling model: “the woman experiences her conflict as a personal one 
and refuses an appraisal by third parties”313; “[t]he more third parties are 
trying to influence the woman, the more she withdraws into illegality”;314 
and “giving the woman the final say provides the best chances to open her 
up for counseling” and thus for carrying the child to term.315 It is also 
reflected in the Court’s insightful elaborations on the necessities of 
counseling.  Accordingly, counseling must be goal-oriented (towards 
protecting the unborn child), but open as to the result; encouraging, but not 
intimidating; awakening understanding, but not indoctrinating.316  The 
government must convey to the woman her legal duty to carry the child to 
term but must not impose this value upon her but must take her and her 
conflict seriously and must try to convince her through reasonable 
information and active help.317  Finally, the Court clearly refers to individual 
empowerment by explicitly putting the government in charge of building a 
child-friendly society, realizing equality for women, and providing women 
with the social support necessary to make a free and responsible decision in 
favor of the child.  The Court’s “changed perception [in Abortion II] of the 
personality and dignity of the woman”318 strongly reflects the principle of 
individual empowerment, a constitutional achievement of the 1989 
Revolution. 
Against this background, I think my analysis draws a much more 
realistic and meaningful picture than the traditional understanding of why 
the Court changed the abortion model in 1993.  It shows that the Court 
 
 312. See supra, 61. 
 313. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1756. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id., at 1757. 
 316. BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1760, 1761. 
 317. Id. 
 318. See the dissenters Justices Mahrenholz and Sommer in BVerfG, NJW 1993, 1774. 
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engaged in an interpretive effort that takes the achievements of the 1989 
Revolution seriously and tries to integrate them into the existing 
constitutional order under the GG. 
 
IV.  Housing 
 
It is finally a decision by the BVerfG on May 26, 1993 that features 
another remarkable change in the Court’s treatment of an important 
constitutional topic in the wake of German unification.319  In this decision 
the Court, for the first time, considers a tenant’s right to ownership in the 
rented apartment property in the sense of Art. 14 I, 1 GG.320  It thereby 
elevates the tenant to the same level of constitutional protection under Art. 
14 GG as the landlord. Prior to the decision, the tenant’s protection under 
Art. 14 GG had been weaker than the landlord’s because only the landlord 
had enjoyed property protection, while the tenant was only protected by the 
landlord’s property’s social obligation under Art. 14 II GG.321 
Like the decisions on gender equality and abortion, the decision on 
tenant protection came at a time when unified Germany’s legislature proved 
unable to integrate revolutionary achievements into the existing 
constitutional order under the GG. Bernd Rüthers, for example, writes that 
just when the GVK had turned out to be unable to agree on proposing a 
constitutional right to housing as an amendment to the GG, the Court 
introduced this right “through the backdoor” by holding the tenant’s right to 
ownership in the rented apartment to be property in the sense of Art. 14 I, 1 
GG.322  The decision not only provides tenants and landlords with equal 
constitutional protection under Art. 14 GG.  It also makes every legislative 
attempt to cut down on existing tenant protection subject to the strict 
requirements of property protection under Art. 14 I GG.323  Tenants’ Art. 14 I 
GG rights must, moreover, be considered in the interpretation and application of 
 
 319. BVerfG, Beschluss v. 26.05.1993, 1 BvR 208/93, BVerfGE 89, 1-14. 
 320. Art. 14 I GG states: “Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their 
content and limits shall be defined by the laws.” 
 321. Art. 14 II GG states: “Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public 
good.” 
 322. Bernd Rüthers, Ein Grundrecht auf Wohnung durch die Hintertür?, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift (NJW) 1993, 2587; similarly Otto Depenheuer, Der Mieter als Eigentümer? - 
Anmerkungen zum Urteil des BVerfG v. 26.05.1993, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 
1993, 2561, 2564. 
 323. See Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2564. 
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every ordinary law, public and private.324 
As in the cases that I have analyzed so far, the question is: Why did the 
Court do that?  And why in 1993 and not, for example, in 1989 or 1990 when 
it also had opportunities to do so?  Again, there is a traditional understanding 
based on doctrinal as well as judicial policy arguments, which, again, I will 
show is unconvincing.  And again, I will demonstrate why the change should 
be understood as a product of the Court’s attempt to integrate revolutionary 
achievements into West Germany’s constitutional order. I will argue that the 
East German revolutionaries, expecting large-scale privatizations of 
government-owned apartments in the GDR upon German unification, had 
called for strong constitutional tenant protection.  This call had been 
transferred to unified Germany, where it collided with stronger constitutional 
landlord protection under Art. 14 I GG.  My thesis is that the Court’s decision 
is best understood as an attempt to integrate the two competing positions in 
the light of the legislature’s inability to do so. 
In the following I will analyze the decision, present and criticize the 
traditional understanding of the change it has brought about, and finally 
present my own view. 
 
1. The Decision 
 
In its May 26, 1993 decision, BVerfG rejects a tenant’s argument that a 
district court’s verdict confirming the tenant’s obligation to vacate the 
apartment violates the tenant’s basic rights, in particular her right to property 
based on Art. 14 I, 1 GG.325 Still, the BVerfG uses the case to say something 
that it had never said before: the tenant’s lease-based right to ownership in 
the rented apartment is property in the sense of Art. 14 I, 1 GG.326 In doing 
so, the Court, for the first time, perceives of the tenant’s right to ownership 
as property and thus provides equal constitutional protection for landlords 
and tenants under Art. 14 GG.327   
Prior to this decision, the Court had considered the tenant’s right to 
ownership only within the landlord’s property’s social obligation under Art. 
 
 324. See Horst Sendler, Unmittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundrechte durch die Hintertür?, 
NJW 1994, 709 et seq. with examples from the field of private law; Matthias Schmidt-Preuß, 
Nachbarschutz des Mieter-Eigentümers?, NJW 1995, 27 et seq. with a public law example. 
 325. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 16 et seq. 
 326. Id., rec. 19. 
 327. For a historical overview, see Helmut Rittstieg, Eigentum als Verfassungsproblem 
(1976). 
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14 II GG.328  As a result, landlords had enjoyed stronger constitutional 
protection than tenants because tenant protection was considered an intrusion 
into the landlord’s property, which could only be justified if it was necessary 
for the public good.329 
The decision is interesting for several reasons.  First, it was not 
necessary for the Court to elaborate on the property quality of the tenant’s 
right to ownership in order to decide the case.  The Court could have left the 
question open because, regardless of whether or not the tenant’s right to 
ownership was property, in the specific case the Court concluded that it had 
not been violated because the district Court had undertaken all necessary 
considerations to justify the lease’s cancellation and the tenant’s eviction 
from the apartment.330  Second, leaving the question open would have been 
exactly what the Court had been doing before.331  Why did the Court break 
with this tradition? The Court itself states its key argument as follows:  
The apartment is everybody’s center of private existence.  The 
individual depends upon its use for the satisfaction of fundamental needs in 
life as well as for the protection of his freedom and the development of his 
personality.  A large part of the population, however, cannot resort to 
property in order to satisfy its need for housing but is forced to rent.  Under 
these conditions the tenant’s right to ownership fulfills functions that are 
typically fulfilled by property in goods.332   
Interestingly, in previous decisions the Court had already considered 
the apartment’s importance as a “center of human existence”333 and as “the 
spatial center of private life”.334  It had also considered that most people 
cannot afford to buy but have to rent.335  However, such considerations had 
never led the Court to establish a functional equivalence between the tenant’s 
right to ownership and property in goods. Instead, it had always considered 
 
 328. See Peter Derleder, in: Gert Brüggemeier & Rudolf Wassermann et al. (eds.), 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Band 3, Besonderes Schuldrecht, Reihe 
Alternativkommentare, Vorbemerkung zu §§ 535 et seq. para. 55 (1979). 
 329. See BVerfGE 18, 121, juris-version, rec. 29, 30; BVerfGE 82, 6, juris-version, rec. 
34; and BVerfGE 83, 82, juris-version, rec. 15. 
 330. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 32; see also Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2561, 
2562. 
 331. See, for example, BVerfGE 18, 121, juris-version, rec. 29; and BVerfG 83, 82, juris-
version, rec. 18. 
 332. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 21 (my italics). 
 333. BVerfGE 18, 121, juris-version, rec. 30. 
 334. BVerfGE, 82, 6, juris-version, rec. 34. 
 335. Id., rec. 33 with further references. 
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the tenant’s interests within the framework of the landlord’s property’s social 
obligation under Art. 14 II GG, i.e., as justifications to interfere with the 
landlord’s right to property.336  What accounts for the change?   
The Court tries to explain it doctrinally: “The essential criterion of 
property in the sense of Art. 14 GG is that a proprietary right is assigned to 
its holder for exclusionary private use and disposal as is the case with respect 
to property in goods.”337  Protected as property are thus “all proprietary rights 
that are assigned to their holder by the law in a way that the holder is allowed 
to exercise all entitlements flowing from these rights for his private benefit 
according to his own responsible decision.”338  The tenant’s right to 
ownership, the Court argues, fulfills these requirements.  It gives the tenant 
an exclusive right to use and dispose of the apartment by, for example, 
subletting it to others, even if the right to sublet depends on the landlord’s 
consent and is thus limited.339  The Court concludes that, since the tenant’s 
right to ownership fulfills the definitional requirements of property, it must 
be considered property.340  So far, so good. 
The problem is that these requirements for the consideration of a 
proprietary right as property in the sense of Art. 14 I, 1 GG were not new in 
1993.341  Moreover, the tenant’s right to ownership based on West 
Germany’s law has always fulfilled them.  Why then did the Court wait until 
1993 to draw its conclusion?  The question becomes even more puzzling if 
one considers that Johann Friedrich Henschel, the justice in charge of 
landlord-tenant issues on the Court’s First Senate at the time, had published 
an article in 1989 in which he emphasized that he saw no reason why the 
tenant’s right to ownership in the rented apartment should be considered 
property.342  Henschel argued that tenants were sufficiently protected under 
the landlord’s property’s social obligation.343 
The literature offers different traditional arguments for what the Court 
did and why. 
 
 336. See BVerfGE 18, 121, juris-version, rec. 30; BVerfGE 82, 6, juris-version, rec. 33, 
34 with further references; and BVerfGE 83, 82, juris-version, rec. 15 with further references. 
 337. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 20. 
 338. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 20. 
 339. Id., rec. 23, 24. 
 340. Id. 
 341. The Court explicitly refers to BVerfGE 83, 201, 208, 209, 210; see BVerfGE 89, 1, 
juris-version, rec. 20, 23, 24. 
 342. Johann Friedrich Henschel, Eigentumsgewährleistung und Mieterschutz, NJW 1989, 
937, 938 et seq. 
 343. Id., at 939. 
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2.  Traditional Understanding. 
 
The literature’s response to the Court’s decision is mixed but mostly 
critical.344 Again, doctrinal and judicial policy arguments may be 
distinguished.  
One author denies Art. 14 GG’s applicability to landlord-tenant 
relationships.345  If the legislature wants to protect the tenant, the argument 
goes, it must do so within the constitutional framework of freedom of 
contract (Art. 2 GG), human dignity (Art. 1 GG), and the social-state clause 
(Art. 20 I, 28 I GG).346  Tenant protection, it is argued, interferes with the 
landlord’s freedom of contract, not with her property.347  Neither does tenant 
protection serve the “public good” in the sense of Art. 14 II, 2 GG; it only 
serves tenants.348  Another argument brought forth against the property 
quality of the tenant’s right to ownership is that a tenant cannot dispose of 
the apartment because a sublet requires the landlord’s consent.349  Finally, it 
is argued that the Court’s decision splits property in the apartment into the 
tenant’s property comprising the right to use the apartment on the one hand 
and the landlord’s property comprising the right to dispose of the apartment 
on the other.350  Split property, however, is said to be unknown in German 
law and “would be a source of steady conflict”.351 
I think these arguments are easily refutable. If the legislature limits the 
landlord’s right to cancel a lease and evict the tenant, it does not only 
interfere with the landlord’s freedom of contract but also with her right to 
use her property.352  The latter is an important right protected under Art. 14 
I, 1 GG.  Tenant protection, on the other hand, does serve the public good 
because a vast majority of the people depend on renting.  Hence, asserting 
that tenant protection has nothing to do with Art. 14 GG ignores an important 
constitutional aspect of the problem.  Regarding “the right to disposal” as a 
 
 344. See, for example, Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2561; Rüthers, supra note 322, 2587. 
 345. See Gerd Roellecke, Das Mietrecht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts - Kritik einer 
Argumentationsfigur, NJW 1992, 1649, 1652 et seq. 
 346. Id., at 1652-54. 
 347. Id., at 1652. 
 348. Id., at 1652-53. 
 349. Id., at 1653; Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2563. 
 350. Roellecke, supra note 345, 1653; Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2563. 
 351. Roellecke, supra note 345, 1653. 
 352. For example, by living in the apartment herself. 
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property requirement, the Court rightly points out that the tenant does have 
a limited right to dispose of the apartment by, for example, subletting it with 
the landlord’s consent.  The Court is, moreover, right in that it has never 
required an unlimited right to disposal in order to consider a proprietary right 
property.353  Neither is there a “substantive” reason to add such a requirement 
now.354  That German law supposedly does not know split property and that 
split property will turn out to be a source of steady conflict is hardly 
convincing either.  First, based on the Court’s decision, the tenant does not 
hold property in the apartment but in her right to ownership in the apartment.  
Hence, doctrinally speaking, there is no split property in the apartment.  
Second, it is hard to see why protecting tenant and landlord equally under 
Art. 14 GG might cause more conflict than protecting the tenant under Art. 
14 II GG and the landlord under Art. 14 I GG.  The conflict between the two 
remains the same because it is based on their conflicting interests.  What has 
changed is the weight that the Court is willing to attribute to the tenant’s 
constitutional position in this conflict; this weight has been increased, which 
I think is a necessary consequence of equal protection. 
A more fundamental critique attacks the Court’s main argument that the 
tenant’s right to ownership must be deemed property because it “fulfills 
functions that are typically fulfilled by property in goods.”  Voices in the 
literature reject the idea that a right’s function may justify its constitutional 
protection because that would damage the protection of freedom.355  “The 
protection of property,” the argument goes, “safeguards the possession of 
goods for the purpose of freedom”;356 if the constitutional protection of 
freedom depends on the function for which that freedom is used, the freedom 
becomes an obligation.357 
I think this argument is wrong for two reasons.  First, a widely accepted 
original justification for the constitutional protection of property is 
functional.  The protection of property has the “function” of securing the 
individual’s economic freedom in order to enable her to autonomously shape 
 
 353. The Court explicitly refers to BVerfGE 83, 201, 209, where it had said that before; 
see BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 24. 
 354. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 24. 
 355. Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2563; similarly Walter Leisner, Eigentum, in: Josef 
Isensee & Paul Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Band VI, § 149 paras. 90 et seq. (1989) with further references. 
 356. Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2563. 
 357. Id.  
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her life358 and participate in society.359  That does not mean that property is 
only protected if it is actually used in this way.  It means that the fundamental 
justification and legitimization of constitutional property protection is based 
on the property’s function for the individual’s life and participation in 
society. It is this concept that the Court applied in its May 1993 decision to 
justify why a tenant’s right to ownership should be protected as property. If 
authors want to criticize this concept, they must to come up with a new 
justification for why private property should be constitutionally protected.  
As far as I can see, none of the critics has done that. 
The second reason is that the authors’ claim that only proprietors of 
goods are protected under Art. 14 I GG is arbitrary. Art. 14 GG’s text does 
not provide any basis for it.  It only protects property without specifying what 
must be considered property.360  In fact, the authors’ assertion expresses a 
specific, a liberal understanding of individual rights. According to this 
understanding, individual rights serve to prevent government interference 
with society.361  By arbitrarily limiting the constitutional protection of 
property to proprietors of goods, these authors try to constitutionalize a 
laissez-faire ideology.  They ignore social requirements for the realization of 
individual freedom and try to preserve the social status quo in favor of a 
property-holding economic elite.362  The Court rejects this ideology and 
explicitly takes social reality into account when it argues that “[a] large part 
of the population . . . cannot resort to property to satisfy its need for housing 
but is forced to rent.  Under these circumstances the tenant’s right to 
ownership fulfills functions that are typically fulfilled by property in 
goods.”363 
There is nothing in the text of the GG that requires, or even justifies, a 
purely liberal understanding of constitutional property protection.364  To the 
 
 358. See Papier, in Theodor Maunz & Günther Dürig, Grundgesetz, Art. 14 para. 1 with 
references to the BVerfG’s established case-law. 
 359. See Id., para. 4. 
 360. The GG does not define property; see BVerfGE 36, 281, 290; BVerfGE 42, 263, 292, 
293. 
 361. See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie, 119 et seq. (2nd 
ed. 1992). 
 362. See Rittstieg, supra note 326, 296 et seq. with a fitting referral to Holmes’ dissent in 
Lochner v. New York, see id., 297. 
 363. BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 21. 
 364. In this respect, I profoundly disagree with Böckenförde, who writes that the civil-
liberal theory reflects the basic normative intention of the basic rights of the GG in response 
to fundamental violations of freedom during the Third Reich; see Böckenförde, supra note 
361, 143.  Rittstieg has demonstrated that a civil-liberal understanding of constitutional 
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contrary, a liberal understanding of property protection was prevalent in 
Germany at a time when economic elites were trying to use property 
protection under Art. 153 of the Weimar Constitution (WRV) in order to 
protect their possessions and the social status quo against an increasingly 
democratic legislature.365  It is the concept of constitutional property 
protection developed by a Reichsgericht (RG) controlled by conservative 
forces starting in 1921.366  The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) further developed 
the RG’s concept after 1949 in order to prevent alternative property concepts 
promoted by social-democratic forces in West Germany.367  Many 
conservative voices still see the preservation of the economic, social, and 
political status quo as an important function of property protection under Art. 
14 I GG.368  However, alternative property concepts were, and are, possible 
under the GG. Art. 14 I GG explicitly states, “Property and the right of 
inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be defined by 
the laws.”369  It is this authority of the legislature to specify property 
protection that the BVerfG refers to in its May 1993 decision when it argues 
that the legislature has taken account of the apartment’s social function for 
the tenant by designing the tenant’s right to ownership in the apartment in a 
way that this right is assigned to the tenant like property in goods.370  On this 
basis, it can be concluded that the Court only respects, and gives 
constitutional expression to, the legislature’s design of the tenant’s right to 
ownership in the apartment when it concludes that this right must be 
considered property in the sense of Art. 14 I, 1 GG. 
Other authors blame the Court for engaging in judicial politics by 
putting the tenant’s right to ownership on a new constitutional basis even 
though that was not necessary to decide the case.371 Otto Depenheuer, for 
example, complains that the Court has succumbed to the Zeitgeist that has 
 
protection against a democratic legislature has less to do with the Third Reich than it is the 
continuation of an economic elite’s strategy to preserve the social status quo against the 
potential of a democratic legislature; see Rittstieg, supra note 326, 286 et seq. 
 365. See Rittstieg, supra note 326, 252 et seq., 269-271; more generally Ingeborg Maus, 
Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus, 47 et seq. (1980). 
 366. See Rittstieg, supra notes, 252 et seq., 256 et seq. referring to RGZ 102, 161, and 
note 326. 
 367. See Rittstieg, supra note, 286 et seq., 288, 289 et seq., and 326. 
 368. See Papier, supra note 358, Art. 14 para. 5. 
 369. My italics.  
 370. See BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version,rec. 21, 22. 
 371. See Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2562; the original reads: “Nicht aus juristischer Not 
geboren, erweist sie [die Entscheidung] sich als Akt rechtspolitischen Wollens: 
Verfassungsgebung durch Verfassungsrichterspruch.” 
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called for a “basic right to housing” or an equivalent state goal.372  A different 
judicial-politics criticism blames the Court for a lack of economic 
understanding. Its main point is that by increasing tenants’ constitutional 
protection the Court alienates potential investors in the housing market and 
thus contributes to the lack of affordable housing.373  Apart from the fact that 
these authors do not provide any empirical data to support their views, they 
obviously overlook the possibility that the Court may have engaged in 
constitutional interpretation to reach its conclusion. 
Finally, there are doctrinal as well as judicial-politics arguments 
supporting the Court’s decision.  One argument is that housing’s social 
importance requires stronger constitutional tenant protection.374  Another 
argument is that tenants’ and landlords’ legal positions are so similar that 
equal constitutional protection is justified.375  Helmut Rittstieg, finally, has 
been demanding property protection for tenants since 1975.  He argues that 
the tenant’s right to ownership in the apartment is a proprietary right based 
on which the tenant has immediate control over the apartment and uses it as 
her “space of freedom for independent activities”.  The BVerfG has always 
held the protection of such a right to be the purpose of property protection 
under Art. 14 I GG.376  Hence, Rittstieg, already in 1975, pointed to the 
rented apartment’s social function in order to justify the protection of the 
tenant’s right to ownership as property.377   
Whatever one may think of these arguments, none of them can explain 
why the Court had not taken them up between 1975, when they were first 
voiced, and 1993.  Moreover, they cannot explain why in May 1993 the 
Court, all of a sudden, did follow Rittstieg’s argument and granted tenants 
property protection under Art. 14 I GG.  As in the previous cases, the 
traditional understanding is thus unable to convincingly explain the 
constitutional change.   
 
 372. Id. 
 373. See Rüthers, supra note 322, 2588, 2589; also Henschel, supra note 342, 943. 
 374. See Derleder, supra note 328, para. 56. 
 375. See Rudolf Gärtner, Wohnungsmietrechtlicher Bestandsschutz auf dem Weg zu 
einem dinglichen Recht?, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 1994, 446; Udo Wolter, Mietrechtlicher 
Bestandsschutz: historische Entwicklung seit 1800 und geltendes Wohnraum-
Kündigungsschutzrecht, 396 et seq. (1984). 
 376. Rittstieg, supra note 326, 331 referring to BVerfGE 24, 367, 389, 400. 
 377. In fact, Lorenz von Stein, already in 1850, wrote that “[e]very possession . . . is . . . 
the body of real personal freedom and freedom’s outer condition” (emphasis added) (“Jeder 
Besitz . . . ist . . . der Körper der wirklichen persönlichen Freiheit und ihre äussere 
Bedingung“); see Lorenz von Stein, The History of the Social Movement in France, 1789 - 
1850, Bd. 2, p. 57 (Kaethe Mengelberg ed. & transl., Bedminster Press 1964). 
1 - FINAL - Jaggi - Revolutionary Reform in German .docx 6/5/2018  11:41 AM 
236 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:3 
The following analysis will show that things become much clearer once 
the decision is put into historical perspective.  As soon as one takes into 
account that a successful revolution had taken place in the GDR in 1989, that 
a constitutional right to housing had been an important achievement of this 
Revolution, and that this achievement had been transferred to unified 
Germany where the institutions were then confronted with the task of 
integrating it into the existing constitutional order under the GG, a new and 
more meaningful understanding of the Court’s decision will emerge. 
 
3.  My Understanding: the decision as an act of integration 
 
My thesis is that with its decision the Court tried to integrate the 
revolutionary achievement of a constitutional right to housing into West 
Germany’s constitutional order under the GG, which had granted stronger 
constitutional protection to landlords than to tenants. 
In West Germany, only the landlord’s position had been protected as 
property under Art. 14 I GG. Tenant protection had been considered an 
interference with landlord property and thus required justification as serving 
the public good (Art. 14 II, 2 GG).  This had resulted in a weaker 
constitutional protection of tenants, even though the Court had taken into 
account both the rented apartment’s function as the center of human 
existence and the fact that most people depended on renting. On this basis, 
the Court had left the question of whether or not a tenant’s right to ownership 
in the rented apartment must be considered property in the sense of Art. 14 
I, 1 GG explicitly open as late as November 1990.378 
A change of constitutional dimensions had taken place in the fall of 
1989 with the successful Revolution in the GDR and in October 1990 with 
German unification.  The Revolution’s call for a constitutional right to 
housing had its conceptual basis in the citizens’ movement’s concept of 
individual empowerment, which had been translated into, inter alia, a call 
for constitutional social rights, not only as objective state goals but as 
judicially enforceable individual constitutional rights.379  Underlying was the 
insight that appropriate housing is one of the most fundamental necessities 
that need to be fulfilled to make human freedom a reality.380 
The people in the streets had supported the citizens’ movement’s 
 
 378. See BVerfGE 83, 82, juris-version, rec. 15, 18; the decision dates from Nov. 13, 1990, 
1 BvR 275/90; see also BVerfGE 18, 121, juris-version, rec. 29, 30. 
 379. See supra, 62 et seq., 106 et seq., 115 et seq. 
 380. See supra, 58 et seq. 
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concept of individual empowerment, including the call for a constitutional 
right to housing. This is reflected, among others, in the fact that 90% of the 
East Germans had been in favor of including a constitutional right to housing 
in a new constitution for unified Germany.381 
The popular call for a constitutional right to housing had found its legal 
manifestation in the revolutionaries’ Social Charter and in their draft 
constitution.382  The Social Charter demanded a “basic right to housing and 
effective tenant protection” in the light of strong insecurity with respect to 
property questions upon unification.383  Against this background, the Social 
Charter put a stronger emphasis on rent regulation and tenant protection 
against arbitrary lease cancellations than on the provision of new housing.384  
The draft constitution included detailed provisions on a right to housing.385 
Art. 25 (1), 1 of the draft guaranteed every citizen a “right to appropriate 
housing”. Art. 25 (1) stated that legal protection against lease cancellation 
must be provided. Art. 25 (1), 3 explicitly elaborated on how to balance 
landlords’ and tenants’ interests: “When balancing tenants’ and landlords’ 
interests against each other, special weight must be accorded to the 
apartment’s outstanding importance for living a life in human dignity.”386  
The draft constitution, thus, accorded particular constitutional weight to the 
tenant’s interests based on the rented apartment’s function for the tenant’s 
life.387  Finally, Art. 25 (1), 4 strengthened the tenant’s position even further 
by stating that a tenant may only be evicted from an apartment once a 
substitute apartment is available.388 
An institutional reaction to the revolutionaries’ call for a constitutional 
right to housing had come from the post-revolutionary GDR’s first freely 
elected government.  The government’s coalition agreement stated that 
“[w]hen amending the GG, it is the government’s goal to introduce social 
rights as non-enforceable individual rights.  This applies primarily to the 
right to labor, housing, and education.”389  The government declaration of 
April 19, 1990, emphasized the government’s responsibility for appropriate 
 
 381. See Jaggi, supra note 1, 70, 71. 
 382. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 594 et seq. 
 383. Markus Bremers, Soziale Staatsziele und soziale Grundrechte: Arbeit, Wohnen, 
soziale Sicherung, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, 141; Jaggi, supra note 6, 595, 596. 
 384. Bremers, supra note 383, 141. 
 385. See also Jaggi, supra note 6, 596 et seq. 
 386. My italics. 
 387. See Bremers, supra note 383, 147; Rogner, supra note 129, 92. 
 388. Id. 
 389. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 606 et seq. (my italics). 
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housing, tenant protection, and rent control.390 
The importance that constitutional tenant protection had acquired 
during the 1989 Revolution must be seen in the light of the fact that most 
people in the GDR had been tenants.  It was mostly the government who had 
acted as landlord, and even private landlord-tenant relationships had been 
strongly regulated.391  Facing unification, East Germans feared the impact on 
their leases of West Germany’s so-called social market economy with its 
foreseeable privatizations of government owned apartments.  For East 
Germans, tenant protection was thus much more important than the provision 
of new housing.  In that situation, a constitutional right to housing aimed at 
forcing even the most conservative legislature to provide for strong tenant 
protection upon German unification. 
The UT and most of the new state constitutions had transferred the 
revolutionary achievement of a constitutional right to housing to unified 
Germany.392  As a matter of principle, West German landlord-tenant law 
entered into force in the new states upon German unification on October 3, 
1990.393  Yet, the UT provided for important exemptions, for example, by 
keeping in force in the new states specified provisions of the GDR’s tenant 
protection law.394  For leases signed in the GDR prior to unification the 
landlord’s right to cancellation remained much more limited than it would 
have been under the Civil Code in West Germany.395  A cancellation of such 
leases for the landlord’s own use, for instance, was, as a matter of principle, 
only possible after December 31, 1995.396  Moreover, the UT temporarily 
limited the landlord’s right to increase rents.397  For example, it stipulated 
that a GDR regulation of June 25, 1990, according to which rent increases 
were allowed only under very limited conditions remained in force until 
December 31, 1991, for already existing residential property.398  Finally, Art. 
 
 390. See Id., 607 et seq. 
 391. Generally on the legal position of tenants in the GDR, see Eckard Pahlke, Die 
Rechtsstellung des Mieters von Wohnraum in der DDR (1983). 
 392. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 617 et seq. 
 393. See Art. 232 § 2 Abs. 1 EGBGB in the UT’s version of 31.08.1990 (BGBl II 1990, 
885, 943). 
 394. Volker Emmerich, in: J. von Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 
Zweites Buch, Recht der Schuldverhältnisse, §§ 535 - 563, Vorb. zu §§ 535, 536 paras. 31, 
34 (13th ed. 1995). 
 395. See Art. 232 § 2 Abs. 2 – 4 EGBGB. 
 396. See Gesetz zur Verlängerung der Wartefristen v. 21.12.1992 (BGBl I 1992, 217); 
Emmerich, in: Staudinger, Vorb. zu §§ 535, 536 para. 32. 
 397. See Emmerich, supra note 394, paras. 33 et seq.  
 398. See UT, Anlage II z. EVertr, Kapitel V, Sachgebiet A - Allgemeines Wirtschaftsrecht, 
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5 UT “recommended” to unified Germany’s legislature to think about 
adopting a right to housing as a constitutional state goal.   
Most new state constitutions contained a right to housing in the sense 
of a government obligation to protect tenants against unreasonable rent 
increases and arbitrary lease cancellations.399  In addition, the state of 
Brandenburg’s constitution had taken over the revolutionaries’ draft 
constitution’s provision according to which special consideration must be 
given to the apartment’s importance for the tenant to live a life in human 
dignity when weighing the tenant’s and the landlord’s interests against each 
other.400  The Brandenburg constitution further increased tenant protection 
by taking over the draft constitution’s provision according to which a tenant 
may only be evicted from an apartment once a substitute apartment is 
available.401 
Again, unified Germany’s legislature was failing to answer the call. The 
most promising attempt to integrate the revolutionary achievement of a 
constitutional right to housing into a new constitution for unified Germany 
had been undertaken by the Kuratorium. Art. 13a of the Kuratorium’s Draft 
stated:  
The government protects the right of every human being to appropriate 
housing.  It promotes the construction and preservation of social and 
ecological housing.  It ensures affordable rents and provides protection 
against lease cancellation, which duly considers the outstanding importance 
of housing for living a life in human dignity. 
This proposal, however, had not become law. Neither had the 
Bundesrat’s Commission402 or the GVK403 been able to agree on a 
constitutional right to housing or on any other constitutional social right, for 
that matter. 
This was the situation when the Court, in May 1993, decided to grant 
constitutional property protection to the tenant’s right to ownership in the 
rented apartment.  The Court had still been able to leave open the question 
 
Wirtschaftspolitik, Wettbewerbs- und Preisrecht, Abschnitt III, Nr. 1 lit. a dd); Emmerich, 
supra note 394, paras. 34, 35 listing further limitations. 
 399. See CONSTITUTIONS OF BRANDENBURG, Art. 47 I; SAXONY, Art. 7; SAXONY-ANHALT, 
Art. 40; and MECKLENBURG-WEST POMERANIA, ART. 17 II; and Jaggi, supra note 6, 623 et 
seq. 
 400. CONSTITUTION OF BRANDENBURG, Art. 47 II. 
 401. Id. 
 402. See Report of the Bundesrat’s Commission Constitutional Reform, in: Fischer & 
Künzel, supra note 17, Band II, 450, 451. 
 403. See GVK Report, in: Fischer & Künzel, supra note 17, Band III, 587 et seq., 591 et 
seq. 
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in a decision on November 13, 1990.404  Even though the revolutionary 
people had already spoken, a little more than a month after unification it had 
been difficult for the Court to know what exactly they had said.  Moreover, 
in November 1990 the Court had not been able know whether or not the 
legislature would live up to the task of integrating the revolutionary 
achievements into the existing West German constitutional order.  The 
political debate over what to make of the 1989 Revolution and its impact on 
unified Germany’s constitutional law had still been in an early phase.  The 
UT, even though it had provided for a transfer of specific tenant protection 
provisions from the post-revolutionary GDR to unified Germany, had left 
the decision of whether or not to adopt constitutional social state goals to 
unified Germany’s legislature (Art. 5 UT).  The UT had given the legislature 
until the end of 1992 to decide the issue.  Against this background, in 
November 1990 it had still been reasonable for the Court to leave the 
question open. 
By May 1993, however, the situation had changed fundamentally. Not 
only was it clear by now that the revolutionary East Germans had achieved 
a constitutional right to housing.  It had also become clear that unified 
Germany’s legislature was not getting anywhere with its efforts to integrate 
this revolutionary achievement into the West German constitutional order 
under the GG.405  At the same time, rents in the new East German states were 
exploding.  Where rents for residential housing in the GDR had been less 
than one East Mark per square meter, they had increased to an average of 
seven West Marks per square meter by 1993.406   
In this situation, it was no longer possible for the Court to close its eyes 
to the revolutionaries’ demands.  It had to do what the legislature had turned 
out to be unable to do: integrate the revolutionary achievement of a 
constitutional right to housing into the GG.  Confronted with an East German 
claim to weigh the tenant’s constitutional position stronger than the 
landlord’s and West Germany’s GG under which the tenant’s constitutional 
position was weaker than the landlord’s, the Court decided to grant both 
tenant and landlord equally strong constitutional protection under Art. 14 
 
 404. BVerfGE 82-83, juris-version, rec. 18. 
 405. See Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2564 referring to Mitteilung des Sekretariats der 
GVK über die Abstimmungsergebnisse zu den Themenkomplexen “Staatsziele und 
Grundrechte” v. 24.02.1993, S. 3. 
 406. Joachim Tesch & Klaus-Jürgen Warnick, Staatliche Wohnungsversorgung und 
kapitalistischer Wohnungsmarkt - Vom DDR Wohnungsbauprogramm zum 
Stadtumbauprogramm Ost, Forum Wissenschaft 2/2004. 
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GG.407   
The Court’s strongest argument for this decision is remarkably close to 
the revolutionaries’ draft constitution’s justification for a constitutional right 
to housing.  Both are explicitly based on the rented apartment’s social 
function to help realize the tenant’s individual freedom and personal 
development.408  Both are rooted in the principle of individual 
empowerment, according to which social reality must be taken into account 
in order to make constitutional individual rights a social reality for everyone.  
The Court’s reasoning also reflects the revolutionary constitutional concept 
of equality of freedom409 by granting landlord and tenant equal constitutional 
protection based on their rights’ equal social function to realize individual 
liberty and personal development.  Another important respect in which the 
Court has brought to bear the revolutionaries’ achievement of a 
constitutional right to housing is that the Court has granted the tenant her 
own constitutional right.  Even if there had been different versions of this 
idea in the catalogue of revolutionary demands (from a judicially enforceable 
individual constitutional right to a constitutional state goal), the 
revolutionaries had clearly wanted the tenant’s constitutional position to be 
more than only a social-obligation annex to the landlord’s property 
protection.  This revolutionary demand is reflected in the Court’s decision to 
consider the tenant’s right to ownership in the apartment to be property in 
the sense of Art. 14 I, 1 GG, i.e. an individual constitutional right.410  This 
individual right provides for particularly strong constitutional tenant 
protection in the light of the fact that, under the GG, individual rights may 
be interpreted as individual claims against the legislature to provide for 
effective individual rights protection.  The Court, in its decision on May 26, 
1993, has brought all these elements from the revolutionaries’ constitutional 
agenda to bear on unified Germany’s constitutional law, even if the Court 
did not explicitly refer to the 1989 Revolution in its reasoning. 
Against this background, it no longer appears as a “timely coincidence” 
 
 407. The Court explicitly emphasizes this, see BVerfGE 89, 1, juris-version, rec. 29 
(“Namentlich folgt aus dem Eigentumsschutz des Besitzrechts nicht, daß im Konflikt beider 
duch die Verfassung geschützten Eigentumspositionen das Bestandsinteresse des Mieters in 
jedem Falle vorgeht”). 
 408. See Art. 25 (1) RTD. 
 409. See Jaggi, supra note 6, 586. 
 410. Depenheuer writes that “. . . demands for a ‘basic right to housing’ or the introduction 
of a respective state goal reflect the tendency of a constitutional upgrade of tenants’ interests,” 
see Depenheuer, supra note 322, 2562.  However, he does not establish the connection 
between this “tendency” and specific constitutional demands by the revolutionary East 
Germans; see Id. 
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that the Court acted as a “substitute legislature” hardly more than three 
months after the GVK had rejected the introduction of a constitutional state 
goal to protect a tenant’s right to housing.411  By integrating the revolutionary 
achievement of a constitutional right to housing into unified Germany’s 
existing constitutional order under the GG the Court, once again, engaged in 
integration through constitutional interpretation. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
This article has demonstrated that unified Germany’s constitutional law 
experienced important changes upon German unification. A state goal of 
environmental protection was added, the Bodenreform-expropriations were 
confirmed, a government obligation to realize gender equality was adopted, 
the requirement of criminal punishment of abortion during the first twelve 
weeks of the pregnancy was given up, and the tenant’s right to ownership in 
the rented apartment was granted property protection under Art. 14 I GG.   
The article has also demonstrated that traditional arguments are unable 
to convincingly explain these changes.  They cannot explain why the changes 
occurred when they occurred. Doctrinal arguments appear arbitrary and 
strongly determined by the desired outcome. Judicial politics arguments give 
up too quickly on the possibility of explaining the changes as results of 
constitutional interpretation.  All traditional arguments have in common that 
they ignore the possibility of the 1989 Revolution’s impact on unified 
Germany’s constitutional law.   
My analysis shows that the changes reflect the attempt by unified 
Germany’s institutions to integrate revolutionary achievements into the 
existing constitutional order under the GG.  The legislature’s adoption of 
environmental protection as a state goal, for example, shows signs of an 
integration of the revolutionary call for a constitutional right to 
environmental protection into a constitutional order that did not know 
constitutional environmental protection.  The BVerfG’s decision to uphold 
the confirmation of the Bodenreform-expropriations appears like the 
integration of the revolutionary demand to confirm the Bodenreform into a 
constitutional order that requires to return illegally expropriated property to 
former owners by adding to Art. 143 III GG a governmental obligation to 
compensate former owners.  The introduction of a government obligation to 
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realize gender equality shows clear signs of integrating the revolutionary call 
for real equality for women into a constitutional order that took a formal-
legal approach to gender equality.  The development of a counseling model 
for the legal treatment of abortion appears like the integration of the 
revolutionary principle of individual empowerment and a woman’s right to 
abortion into a constitutional order that is unable to compromise the unborn 
child’s right to life. And finally, the introduction of property protection for 
the tenant’s right to ownership in the rented apartment can be explained as 
the integration of a revolutionary call for a constitutional right to housing 
into a constitutional order that provided for stronger constitutional protection 
of landlords.  Contrary to the traditional understanding, these explanations 
take account of both the 1989 Revolution’s constitutional meaning for 
unified Germany and the possibility of constitutional interpretation. 
My analysis, thus, demonstrates that, despite Ackerman’s thesis of 
Germany as an example for “elitist constitutionalism,” the German BVerfG 
has not only projected itself “as the preeminent guardian of Germany’s post-
1945 foundational commitments”.412  After German unification in 1990, it 
has engaged in revolutionary reform through constitutional interpretation. 
Some of the 1989 Revolution’s constitutional achievements have thus had a 
substantive impact on unified Germany’s constitutional law, which, 
therefore, is, at least to some extent, a co-production between the 
revolutionary East Germans and West Germany, even without a formal 
plebiscite on a new constitution for unified Germany.  Unified Germany’s 
constitutional law is thus also an example for the revolutionary model. 
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